LaVar Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Company and Gail Barron : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1950
LaVar Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Company
and Gail Barron : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David L. McKay; George M. McMillan; McKay, Burton, Nielsen and Richards; Attorney for
Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Co., No. 7456 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1274
'in th~ Supreme Court of the 
' State of Utah 
.LaVAR PARK 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
- vs.-
MOORMAN MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, 
a c;orporation 
Defendant tmd appellant 
Civil No. 
7456 
ILEJ 
and GAIL BARRON, · St.P _; t~o() 
Defendant _ _ _ 
Ci~~-.s;;;;;;~·Ut~ 
-/ BRIEF ~OF APPELLANT 
. DAVID L. McKAY 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN 
and RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pa·ge 
STATEMENT OF FACTS________________________________________________________________ 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON________________________________ 9 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 11 
POINT NO. I. THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMIT-
TING THE CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE 
THEORY OF EXPRESS WARRANTY ____________________________ 12 
A. No statement of fact was made to Park such as 
constituted an express warranty ________________________________________ 12 
B. Park did not rely on any oral representation ____________________ 22 
C. The alleged statement of fact submitted to the jury 
as a warranty was not proved to be untrue when made ____ 25 
POINT NO. II. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMIT-
TING THE JURY TO FIND EITHER (A) THAT 
BARRON HAD EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AUTHOR-
ITY TO MAKE ANY WARRANTY WHA TSO-
EVER CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S FEED, OR 
(B) THAT MOORMAN MANUFACTURING COM-
PANY RATIFIED ANY STATEMENT OR WAR-
RANTY MADE BY BARRON, OR (C) THAT 
MOORMAN MANUFACTURING COMPANY WAS 
ESTOPPED TO DENY THE AUTHORITY OF 
BARRON TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT OF WAR-
RANTY ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 
A. There was no express authority to make any state-
ments as to warranties; there was no implied author-
ity to make any such statements inasmuch as the 
proof by both plaintiff and defendant is unequivocal 
and clear that such statements are as relied on by the 
plaintiff are unusual and not customary ________________________ 28 
B. Defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company is 
not bound by the statements or representations, if 
any, of Barron on the theory of ratification ____________________ 41 
C. There was no justification for submitting this case to 
the jury upon the theory that the Moorman Manu-
facturing Company is estopped to deny liability for 
the statements of Barron, or for his authority to 
make any statements or warranties allegedly on be-
half of this defendant___________________________________________________ 4 3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
POINT NO. III. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLD-
ING THAT DEFENDANT IS LIABLE IN THE 
THEORY OF BREACH OF EXPRESS AND IM-
PLIED WARRANTIES AS TO THE METHOD OF 
FEEDING AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE FEED 
ITSELF ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45 
POINT NO. IV. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE INFERENCE 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S LOSS, IF HE HAD ANY, WAS 
THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE USE OF 
EITHER POULTRY MINTRATE 40 OR THE SELF-
FEED METHOD OF FEEDING, OR BOTH __________________ 48 
POINT NO. V. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMIT-
TING EXHIBIT C._____________________________________________________________ 61 
POINT NO. VI. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS THE-
0 R Y 0 F DAMAGES__________________________________________________________ 6 3 
A. The court erred in permitting recovery based upon 
the loss of chickens and, in addition, the loss of prof-
its from the dead chickens _______________________________________________ 62 
B. The evidence with reference to loss of profits was 
remote and conjectural. It lacked the definiteness 
and completeness required by law for proof of this 
nature of damages. The Court, therefore, erred in 
permitting the case to go to the jury upon the theory 
of loss of profits ______________________________________________________________ 67 
C. The procedure in the trial with respect to proof was 
prejudicial to defendant's cause ______________________________________ 77 
D. In instructing upon damages, the Court failed to 
take into consideration the intervening causes which 
the evidence of the plaintiff shows to have proxi-
mately caused or proximately contributed to the 
deaths andjor loss of production, if any, in plain-
tiff's chickens, and the Court failed to instruct the 
jury properly upon the duty of the plaintiff to mini-
mize his loss____________________________________________________________________ 79 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Nixon, 139 P. (2d) 216, 104 Utah, 262 ___________________ 60 
Bain v. Withey, 107 Ala, 2 2 3, 18 So. 217--------------------------------------- 18 
Baldwin v. Daniel, 69 Ga. 78 2------------------------------------------------------ 18 
Barrie v. Jerome, 112 Ill. App. 3 2 9---------------------------------------------------- 18 
Burnett v. Hensley, 118 Iowa 575, 92 N. W. 678 _____________________ 18 
Bryant v. Crosby, 40 Me. 9---------------------------------------------------------- 19 
Beck v. Freund, 117 N. Y. Supp. 193 ___________________________________________ 32 
Chalmers v. Harding, 17 L T NS 57}___________________________________________ 18 
Crosby v. Emerson, 142 Fed. 713, 74 C. C. A. 45 (CCA 3) ____________ 18 
Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterman, 278 Mich. 615, 270 N. W. 
8 0 7 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 19 
Cash Register Co. v. Townsend Grocery Store, 137 N. C. 
6 52, 5 o S. E. 3 0 6------------------------------------------------------------ 19 
Chas. E. Morris & Co. v. Bynum Bros., 93 So. 467, 207 Ala. 
541 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
Churchill Grain & Seed Co., Inc. v. Buchman, 197 N.Y. S. 552, 
2 04 App. Dec. 3 0-------------------------------------------------------------- 3 3 
Central Commercial Co. v. Lehon, 173 Ill. App. 27 ________________________ 37 
Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy Lunch Co., 215 Mass. 177, 100 N. 
E. 1 0 7 8-------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 8 
Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Gelvin, 238 Fed. 14, 151 C. 
C. A. 90, L. R. A. 1917C, 983 ________________________________________ 65 
Crouch v. Natl. Livestock Remedy Co. ( 1928), 205 Iowa 51, 
217 N. W. 5 57------------------------------- 59 
Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. J. C. Weeter Lumber Co. (1923) 
61 Utah 50 3, 2 15 Pac. 9 9 5-------------------------------------------------- 17 
De Zeeuw v. Fox Chemical Co. (1920), 189 Iowa 1195, 179 
N. W. 6 o 5 ----------------------------------------------- 15 
Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N. E. 107, 2 L. R. A. 
4 7 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
Dietterich v. Bartunek, 38 Ohio App. 46, 175 N. E. 614 _______________ 20 
Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc., 99 Utah 
18 8, 103 P. (2d) 65 0------------------------------------------------------- 3 8 
Edwards v. Clark, 8 3 P. ( 2d) 1 0 2 }________________________________________________ 59 
Ellerson v. Grove (1930), C. C. A. 4th, 44 Fed. (2d) 493 ____________ 75 
Farrows v. Andrews, 69 Ala. 96-------------------------------------------------- 16 
Friedman & Sons v. Kelly, 102 S. W. 1066, 126 Mo. App. 279 _______ 34 
Gaar v. Halverson, 128 Iowa 603, 105 N. W. 108 ___________________________ 18 
·Gray v. Gurney, etc. Co., 57 S. D. 280, 231 N. W. 940 ________________ 20 
George DeWitt Shoe Co. v. Adkins, 98 S. E. 209, 83 W.Va. 267 ____ 38 
George B. Leavitt Co. v. Couturier, 23 Pac. (2d) 1101, 82 
Utah 2 5 6------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IV 
Gerra·rd, S. A. & Co. v. Fricker ( 1934), 27 P. {2d) 678, 42 
Ariz. 50 3----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64 
Harburger v. Stern, 189 N. Y. S. 74------------------------------------ 20 
Ide v. Brody, 15 6 Ill. A pp. 4 7 9---------------------------------------------------- 3 8 
Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 37L _____ 19 
John Stimber & Co. v. Keene, 152 S. W. 661 (Texas)-------------------- 30 
Kirsch v. Benyunes, 174 N.Y. S. 794, 105 N.Y. Misc. 648 _________ 19 
Lamb v. Boyles (1926), 192 N.C. 542, 135 N. E. 464 ________________ 57 
Micklen Tire Co. v. Schultz, 295 Pa. St. 140, 145 Atl. 67 __________ 17 
McCullough v. Bales, 125 Kan. 670, 265 P. 1110 ___________________________ 19 
Morley v. Consolidated Mfg. Co., 196 Mass. 257, 81 N. E. 993 ____ 19 
Maggiros v. Edson, 164 N. Y. S. 377---------------------------------------- 19 
Morse v. Illinois Power & Light Corp., 14 N. E. (2d) 259, 
294 Ill. App. 498 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
Miller v. Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co., 293 N. W. 4, 
2 2 8 Iowa 6 9 3---------------------------------------------------------------- 64 
National Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 
(1943), 143 P. (2d) 12, 23 Cal. (2d) 193---------------------- 75 
Pate v. J. S. McWilliams Auto Co., 193 Ark. 620, 101 S. W. 
( 2d) 794--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
Palmer v. Rosedale Catering Co. (1940), La·. App. 195 So. 859 _______ 58 
Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah 69, 272 P. 229 _______________________________ 60 
Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell and Braun Co. (1939), 139 Maine 
5 12, 3 A tl. ( 2 d) 6 5 0----------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Rowe Mfg. Co. v. Curtis-Straub Co., 223 Iowa 858, 273 N. W. 
8 9 5 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
Rosenbush v. Learned, 242 Mass. 297, 136 N. E. 341__ _________________ 19 
Rubin v. Askins, 204 N. Y. Supp. 827, 123 Misc. Rep. 155 ____________ 33 
Royal Seed and Milling Co. v. Thorne ( 1928), 142 Miss. 92, 
1 0 2 So. 2 8 2---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 8 
Reese v. Smith (1937), 9 Cal. (2d) 324, 70 P. (2d) 933 ____________ 58 
Reid v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. R. Co., 39 Utah 617, 118 
p. 1 0 0 9------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6 0 
Schroeber v. T rubee, 3 5 Fed. 6 52 (C. C. Com.)--------------------------- 18 
Sleeper v. Wood, 60 Fed. 888, 21 U. S. App. 127, 9 CCA 289 
( CCA 1 ) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
Shambraugh v. Current, 111 Iowa 121, 82 N. W. 497 ____________________ 18 
Stumpp v. Lynbar, 84 N. Y. S. 912------------------------------------------------ 19 
St. Hubert's Guild v. Quinn, 64 N.Y. Misc. 336, 118 N.Y. S. 
52 8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 19 
Sheffer v. Willoughby (1896), 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. 253 ___ 58 
Spackman v. Benefit Assoc. of Ry. Employees ( 1939), 97 Utah 
91 ' 8 9 p. ( 2 d ) 4 9 0------------------------------------------------------------ 59 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v 
Sumsion v. Streator Smith, Inc. ( 1943), 103 Utah 44, 132 P. 
( 2 d) 6 8 0------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6 0 
Smith v. Industrial Com. (1943), 104 Utah 318, 140 P. (2d) 
314 ------------------------------------------------------------ 6 0 
Towell v. Gatewood, 3 Ill. 2 2, 33 Am. Dec. 4 3 7---------------------------- 18 
Tollerton & Warfield Co. v. Gilruth, 112 N. W. 842, 21 S.D. 
3 2 0 --------------------------------------------------------------- 3 2 
Tremdling v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 P. so ________ 60 
Washburn-Crosby Co. v. K.indervatter, 147 App. Div. 114, 131 
N. Y. S. 8 7 L ---------------------------------- 19 
TEXT BOOKS 
99 A. L. R. 938_ ------------------- 75 
3 Blackstone Commentaries, 165--~------------- 25 
3 Corpus Juris, Secundum (C. J. S.) Sec. 234, P. 1345 et seq ________ 65 
17 Corpus Juris, Sec. 185, P. 879------------------------------------------- 65 
Mechem on Agency, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 889, Pages 635, 636 ________ 38 
Restatement of the Law of Agency, Sec. 63, Comment "C" Sub. 
Sec. 1 ----------------------------------- 29 
Williston on Sales, Sec. 211, 1 Rev. Ed. Vol. 1, P. 548 _____________ 26 
2 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 448, P. 439 _______________________________ 56 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LaVAR PARK 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
- vs.-
MOORMAN MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, 
a corporation 
Defendant and appellant 
and GAIL BARRON, 
Defendant 
Brief of Appellant 
STATElviENT OF FACTS 
Civil No. 
7456 
The plaintiff in this action is engaged in the chicken 
business in Riverton, Utah (R. 120), and the defendant 
Moorman Manufacturing Company is a corporation organ-
ized in Illinois, and engaged in the business of the manu-
facture and sale of various feeds for poultry and livestock. 
(SeeR. 627 et seq.) The plaintiff alleges in his complaint 
that on or about June 9, 1948, defendant Gail Barron 
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contacted plaintiff at his residence in Riverton and repre- ~r1 
sented himself to be a salesman for the Moorman Manu- ~l 
facturing Company, and represented further that the 
company was selling a protein concentrate for chickens t~ 
which would save considerable time, effort and expense . ma 
in the feeding of chickens. (R. 1-5) The new feed was •. ~~ 
sold under the trade name ((Poultry Mintrate 40". It is 1!t 
a concentrate intended to be fed with other feeds. (R. 621) ~1 
The plaintiff's suit is really based upon three theories. ~' 
The first is that plaintiff made a written agreement with 
the defendant through its agent guaranteeing certain re-
sults through the use of t(Mintrate 40" and the ((self-feed" 
method of feeding. The second theory is that of a breach 
of express warranties under the Uniform Sales Act. The 
third theory is that the defendant breached the implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, as defined 
under the Sales Act. The trial court refused recovery 
under the first of these three theories because plaintiff 
failed in his proof. (Instruction No. 2; R. 79) Re-
covery was permitted under either or both of the other 
two. (Instructions 14, 15 and 16; R. 87-89) 
Because one of the theories upon which recovery was 
permitted was that of express warranty, the conversations 
between Barron and Park are set forth in some detail 
under Point I of this brief. In substance they were to the 
effect that the Moorman Manufacturing Company was 
offering a new feed to save chicken men time and money; 
that chickens using this feed would not moult and would 
produce not less than 65% and that there had been better 
results than that. (R. 126-127) Barron said that the new 
feed had been tried numerous times and that it had been 
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proved to be the equal or superior of any feed now on the 
market. (Ibid) 
Two methods of feeding chickens were described in 
the testimony. The ((mash" method consists in keeping 
mash before the birds at all times, and feeding sera tch 
once a day on the floor of the coops. Alfalfa and grit are 
often fed also. The ((self-feed" or cafeteria method con-
sists in keeping concentrate and oats or barley before 
the birds at all times, with grit or some other form of 
calcium, and feeding scratch, grain, wheat or corn on a 
limited basis. (R. 624) The scratch is scattered on the 
floor of the coops. The testimony is that Barron recom-
mended the ((self-feed" method to Park. 
Apparently the plaintiff believed that the ttself-feed" 
method was revolutionary in the poultry business. He 
stated without hesitation in cross-examination that this 
lawsuit is based upon the idea that there is something wrong 
with the method. (R. 238, 239) 
After the plaintiff had agreed to use the new feed 
by this method for part of his chickens, but before any 
feed had arrived (R. 135-136), Barron wrote out a 
statement on a scratch pad in which he purported to speak 
for the Moorman Manufacturing Company. This written 
statement is as follows (Exhibit C) : 
uit is agreed that the La Var Park feeds ap-
proximately 2850 laying hens in accordance with 
the tself-feed' sponsored by the Moorman Manu-
facturing Company. It is further agreed that in the 
event of these birds failing to produce an equal 
amount of eggs for the same food costs as his other 
hens, now on a different method of feeding, the 
Moorman Manufa·cturing Company will reimburse 
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Mr. Park the entire amount of the money differ-
ence. 
In the event of sickness an uninterested vet-
erinary will be secured by Mr. Park and the repre-
sentative of the Moorman Manufacturing Com-
pany, and the cause of the sickness will be deter-
mined. In the event that the illness is caused by 
the feeding program, the Moorman Manufacturing 
Company will reimburse Mr. Park for his loss. 
In the event of illness by some other cause the 
Moorman Manufacturing Company will not be 
responsible. 
This agreement is entered into on the 19th of 
June, 1948. 
Signed-Gail Barron 
Moorman Manufacturing Co. 
Representative." 
The detailed circumstances surrounding the exe-
cution of this writing are not here discussed, because in 
the first place there was no proof of the kind required 
under the first paragraph of the writing, and in the second 
place, no veterinary was obtained, as agreed upon. The 
document was admitted by the Court on the theory that 
it tended to corroborate the plaintiff's testimony as to the 
oral representations. (R. 140) 
Plaintiff purported to state three causes of action in 
his ·Complaint. The First Cause of Action set forth the 
statements and representations made by Barron to plain-
tiff, and then stated that they were untrue; uthat said 
feed together with the method of feeding was not as good 
or better than feeds now on the market and that by reason 
of the false representations and warranties of the defendant 
and reliance thereon by the plaintiff, plaintiff was 
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damaged. (R. 1-3) The Second Cause of Action stated 
that by reason of the false representations and warranties, 
plaintiff had lost ccmore than half of 2850 hens which he 
originally placed on the ccMintrate 40" through culling 
and deaths and as a result thereof will be greatly da~aged 
through the loss of egg production in the future", and that 
he was damaged in an additional amount as loss of profits. 
(R. 3, 4) The Third Cause of Action, which was filed 
after the first pre-trial conference pleaded a breach of the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under 
the Sales Act. (R. 39, 30} 
Defendant Gail Barron was never served and did not 
appear as party to the action, although he testified as one 
of the plaintiff's witnesses. 
When Park met Barron, the plaintiff was alarmed over 
picking in his young chickens; in fact, Barron first sold 
him some minerals to stop the picking. This was before 
Mintrate was discussed. (R. 179-180) 
The conversation concerning the qualities of ccMin-
trate" occurred around the middle of June, 1948. Soon 
after, the plaintiff put 2850 chickens on defendant's feed 
and the method of feeding advocated by Barron, and kept 
approximately 3500 on the mash method and the kind of 
feed he had been using. (R. 142-143) At first he was 
satisfied with the results of the Mintrate. (R. 144) In 
about three weeks his production on these birds had risen 
to approximately 63~ %. (R. 144) At about that time 
he began to notice an unusual amount of picking, and his 
testimony is that the picking occurred much more severe-
ly in the Mintrate pens than in the conventional feed pens. 
(R. 146-148) He states that some of the Mintrate 
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chickens lost weight and that many of them died, but he 
was unable to produce any figures from which could be 
ascertained the relative deaths during the months of July, 
August and September. He used the feed and feeding 
method until approximately August 18th, when it was 
discontinued. (R. 148) 
From the time of the first picking in his chickens-
before he fed Mintrate-to the time of the trial, a period 
in excess of sixteen months, plaintiff never consulted a 
veterinary concerning the illness or loss of production in 
his flocks. His only evidence as to the cause of the pick-
ing, deaths and loss of production in his birds was that 
three chicken producers in Salt Lake besides himself testi-
fied that they conducted similar operations during the time 
involved and comparable numbers of chickens were placed 
on their usual diet and feeding program and on the ((self-
feed" and t(Mintrate 40" by each of these witnesses. Al-
though none of these witnesses had figures any more re-
liable than Park, they were permitted to testify in sub-
stance and effect that the chickens on the mash program 
prospered while the birds on the t(Mintrate" using the 
((self-feed" plan became ill. 
There was absolutely no testimony by the plaintiff 
that tended to show that any deleterious substances were 
used in Poultry Mintrate 40, although plaintiff did admit 
that the sample of the feed was being tested. All of the 
testimony by persons who had had any experience with the 
ccself-feed" method was that the method was sound, and 
that when it was properly used it gave excellent results. 
(See testimony of Dr. Wallace Emslie, R. 495-530; Dr. 
C. I. Draper, R. 626-636) The ttself-feed" method was 
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extensively tested by a number of state universities, with 
the result that it was highly recommended. (See testimony 
of plaintiff's witness, Wood, on cross examination, R. 380-
381, 391-39 3.) 
There is likewise nothing in the record from which 
the jury could have inferred that the contents of Mintrate 
40 are not entirely satisfactory and proper for chickens. 
The defendant feed company takes great care in main-
taining the proper proportion of ingredients in the feed. 
This formula is based upon scientific principles and sound 
poultry practice. No witness testified that the ingredients 
in the feed are not wholesome and nutritious. All of the 
testimony that was produced, in fact, is to the effect that 
the feed is entirely proper for chickens, and that it will 
sustain and improve laying hens. The plaintiff's testimony 
that his chickens ((starved to death" by eating too much 
Mintrate and too much oats is absolutely ridiculous. 
It is interesting that one of plaintiff's witnesses stated 
that he was acquainted with the use of ccMintrate 40" in 
the mash method of feeding, but that he had not previously 
tried it under the ccSelf-Feed" plan. His testimony was 
that under the mash method the feed was successful and 
·- satisfactory. Plaintiff himself said he believed that it 
~ was the feed and combination of the oats that produced 
the unfortunate results. (R. 238-239) At another 
place in his testimony plaintiff states that his chickens 
starved to death from eating too much oats. (R. 187) 
Plaintiff's objections were to the quantity of oats. (R. 239) 
It is not contended that the defendant Moorman 
Manufacturing Company sold plaintiff any oats. Nor is 
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there any evidence to the effect that chickens fed oats 
alone would die from starvation. On the contrary, oats is the 
best single grain for chickens (See testimony of Emslie, 
Draper and Wood, R. 495-530, 626-636, and 380-381, 
391-393, respectively). 
Some time around the middle of August, 1948, the 
defendant company learned that plaintiff was dissatis-
fied with the results he was obtaining, and it sent its man-
ager of the service department, Roger Mittelberg (some-
times spelled ccMittleberg" in the record), to investigate. 
Mr. Mittelberg did not learn that plaintiff had been guaran-
teed any results or that plaintiff claimed that defendant 
was liable for breach of warranty until August 28th. On 
this date he saw for the first time the writing heretofore 
referred to. He and Park ended their discussion in a very 
unfriendly attitude. Mittelberg's testimony was that he 
told Park the company was not bound by the writing or 
anything that Barron said. (R. 799-801) Park hedges 
somewhat on the words used but he testifies that he defi-
nitely got the impression that the company did not con-
sider itself liable. (R. 205, 239) At that time plaintiff 
had ceased using the feed and was back on the mash 
method. (R. 204) 
Plaintiff's attempted proof of damages is somewhat 
involved, and it will be discussed in more detail under 
Point V of this brief. At this place we will say simply 
that he hoped to recover not only for loss of chickens 
during the time they were fed ccMintrate 40" under the 
feeding method indicated right up until the time of the 
trial, but in addition thereto he asked for damages on 
the theory that the birds which died would have laid a 
[li 
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certain number of eggs if they had lived, and that he 
should be permitted to recover the value of those eggs. 
During the spring, summer and fall of 1948, plain-
tiff's birds were infected with chicken-pox (R. 193, 199), 
tracheitis, pullorum, big liver (R. 186) and Newcastle. 
(R. 206) All of the diseases ex.cept Newcastle and big liver 
were in the chickens before July. Big liver was present 
to some extent throughout the entire summer and fall, but 
because plaintiff had no expert help with his chickens 
nobody was able to say exactly the extent to which the 
deaths were contributable to this disease. Newcastle 
hit his flocks during the latter part of September and the 
early part of October. At this time the birds went into 
a moult. Plaintiff was unable to say how many of his 
chickens died from picking, how many died from New-
castle, how many were lost from big liver or other 
causes. His only counts in fact were at the time he moved 
the 2850 across the road, about June 1, 1948, and on 
December 4, 1948. (R. 274) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I. THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE 
CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE THEORY OF EXPRESS WAR-
:. RANTY. 
A. No statement of fact was made to Park such as 
constituted an express warranty. 
B. Park did not rely on any oral representation. 
C. The alleged state1nent of fact submitted to the 
jury as a warranty was not proved to be untrue when made. 
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POINT NO. II. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
JURY TO FIND EITHER (A) THAT BARRON HAD EXPRESS 
OR IMPLIED AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY WARRANTY WHAT-
SOEVER CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S FEED, OR (B) THAT 
MOORMAN MANUFACTURING COMPANY RATIFIED ANY 
STATEMENT OR WARRANTY MADE BY BARRON, OR (C) 
THAT MOORMAN MANUFACTURING COMPANY WAS ES-
TOPPED TO DENY THE AUTHORITY OF BARRON TO MAKE 
ANY STATEMENT OR WARRANTY. 
A. There was no express authority to make any state-
ments as warranties; there was no implied authority to 
make any such statements inasmuch as the proof by both 
plaintiff and defendant is unequivocal and clear that 
such statements as are relied on by the plaintiff are unusual 
and not customary. 
B. Defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company is 
not bound by the statements or representations of fact, if 
any, of Barron on the theory of ratification. 
C. There was no justification for submitting this case 
to the jury upon the theory that the Moorman Manufac-
turing Company is estopped to deny liability for the state-
ments of Ba.rron, or for his authority to make any state-
ments or warranties allegedly on behalf of this defendant. 
POINT NO. III. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT IS LIABLE IN THE THEORY OF BREACH OF 
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES AS TO THE METHOD OF 
FEEDING AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE FEED ITSELF. 
POINT NO. IV. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS INSUFFI-
CIENT TO JUSTIFY THE INFERENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
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LOSS, IF HE HAD ANY, WAS THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF 
THE USE OF EITHER POULTRY MINTRATE 40 OR THE SELF-
FEED METHOD OF FEEDING, OR BOTH. 
POINT NO. V. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EX-
HIBIT C. 
POINT NO. VI. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS THEORY OF 
DAMAGES. 
A. The Court erred in permitting recovery based 
upon the loss of chickens and, in addition, the loss of profits 
from the dead chickens. 
B. The evidence with reference to loss of profits was 
remote and conjectural. It lacked the definiteness and com-
pleteness required by law for proof of this nature of 
damages. The Court, therefore erred in permitting the case 
to go to the jury upon the theory of loss of profits. 
C. The procedure in the trial with respect to proof 
was prejudicial to defendanfs cause. 
D. In instructing upon damages, the Court failed 
to take into consideration the intervening causes which the 
evidence of the plaintiff shows to have proximately 
caused or proximately contributed to the deaths and/ or 
loss of production, if any, in plaintiff's chickens, and the 
Court failed to instruct the jury properly upon the duty 
of the plaintiff to minimize his loss. 
ARGU:MENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY 
UPON THE THEORY OF EXPRESS WARRANTY. 
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The Court instructed the jury that the plaintiff 
could recover upon either of two basic theories. (In-
struction No. 14; R. 87) The first theory was that of 
breach of express warranty. The second theory was that 
of breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose. (Instruction No. 18; R. 88, 89) The fallacies 
of the second theory are pointed out in the brief under 
the heading dealing with proximate causation~ We desire 
to point out under the present heading that there is no 
basis in law for submitting the case to the jury on the 
theory of express warranties under the Sales Act. 
The first essential for recovery based upon the theory 
of express warranty is that the seller must have made a 
statement of fact as distinguished from a statement of 
opinion or ccpuffing" or udealers' talk" or predictions or 
broken promises. The theory of express warranty in the 
law of sales grew out of the theory of fraud in the law of 
torts. In both situations, recovery is based upon the 
making of a statement of fact, an act in reliance on the 
statement, and the falsity of the statement. In this case 
neither of these elements was present. There was no 
statement of fact, no reliance, and no proof that any 
statement made was untrue at the time of its utterance. 
A. No statement of fact was made to Park such as 
constitutes an express warranty. 
The Court's attention is here invited to statements, 
according to plaintiff and his witnesses, made by Gail 
Barron to Mr. Park as alleged inducements for the sale. 
Mr. Park testified: uHe said there would be no moulting 
from fifteen or eighteen months over the laying period of 
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a chicken, and they would never lay below sixty-five per 
cent, and that there had been better results than that; that 
one woman was supposed to have got ninety per cent." 
In response to the ·question, uwhat did he say about this 
particular method of feeding?" Park said, uwell, he said 
there were three ways to feed and the number one method 
was the easiest, and that is what they recommended mostly 
was the number one feeding program." (R. 126, 127) 
To the question, uDid he make any other statement con-
cerning this feed during that time?", Park said: uWell, 
just that it was a good feed and thought well of, that is 
about all." (R. 128) 
Mrs. Park stated the conversation as follows: 
ccA. So I walked over to them and he asked me 
what I thought of it. I told him I did not know 
anything about the mintrate or his feed plan, and 
he said: 
(Well, Mrs. Park, it is cheaper feed, and it will 
stop the pick-outs and blow-outs. It will make 
your chickens pay 65 per cent or more, from 10 to 
15 months.' 
I said: (That is pretty good feed, then.' 
He said: (Don't you believe in feeding it?' 
I said: (Well, I never decided things like that 
for my husband.' 
He said: (I will give him a written guaranty'-
or something of that order. With that conversation 
I said: (That is entirely up to him.' 
Q. Was anything said about other persons hav-
ing used this feed and obtained results? 
A. Well, he just said they had others use it. He 
did not tell me, and I did not bother to ask him." 
(R. 512) 
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Later Mrs. Park said, ((Well, he was just telling 
me how good the feed was, what it was supposed to 
do. I believe he did mention moulting." (R. 513) 
Gail Barron testified that he told Park: 
ccA. I told him what I had been told, and in 
addition I had pamphlets-the pamphlets I hold 
here, which he read. I explained the method as it 
was used. I explained that it did not require having 
a grinding machine or mixing machine, because 
this method eliminated that, and it did not require 
that he buy his mash from commercial sources; 
and that in this way, on this plan, he would be able 
to feed his birds cheaper. It would cost him less 
money. 
Q. Did you say anything about the extent of 
lay that could be expected from the mintrate birds 
of this type? 
A. I told him the birds had not laid under 65 
per cent. I told him that and made the statement 
based on what I had heard-not that I had seen 
it personally or knew it personally myself. 
Q. Based on whose statement? 
A. On Mr. McCullough's statement and Mr. 
McArthur's statement. 
Q. Did you tell him anything about what he 
could expect? 
A. That he could expect to get 65 per cent or 
better in view of the fact that anyone else using 
it did that, and he could expect to get it. 
Q. Did you compare this with other feeds? 
A. Yes. We discussed-Mr. Park and myself, 
we discussed it completely in every detail. We 
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spent the biggest part of one day talking about this 
feed, in relation to other feeds and other methods. 
Q. What did you tell him about this feed in 
relation to other methods? 
A. That it was simpler, that it was less expen-
sive, that his chickens, if he fed them on this feed, 
on the method they described, the chickens would 
not moult and that he could expect a 15 months 
lay without a moult. 
Q. Did you say anything about the manner 
of feeding, other than what is stated in the pamph-
lets? 
A. Yes, this manner of feeding makes it easier. 
All you do is to fill the hoppers, and you can fill 
them clear full, then you don't need to feed the 
chickens again till the hoppers are about empty. 
You don't have to go into the coops with buckets of 
feed." 
It is submitted that the statements testified to by 
these witnesses, considered as a whole and in their context, 
merely constitute ccpu:ffing" or ccdealer's talk" or pre-
dictions. Such statements do not furnish a basis for re-
covery upon the theory of express warranty. 
In De Zeeuw v. Fox Chemical Company ( 1920), 
189 Iowa. 1195, 179 N. W. 605, the seller of a hog remedy 
stated to a prospective purchaser that the remedy would 
improve the growth and condition of hogs. Plaintiff 
alleged in his complaint that he relied on this statement 
as a warranty and that defendant's feed did not improve 
the growth and condition of the animals, but, rather, 
resulted in their deaths. The trial court declined to direct 
a verdict for the defendant, and after the jury had re-
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turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and a judgment 
was entered, defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of 
Iowa reversed the trial court's decision, stating in answer 
to the argument that the question of warranty was pro-
perly submitted to the jury: 
uw e find nothing that pleads a warranty or 
that would make a jury question of whether such 
a plea if made was sustained. The most that appears 
is the claim of one who desires to sell a worm pow-
der that its use would be beneficial to certain ani-
mals that were then ill or not thriving. 
((If on this it may go to the jury whether there 
has been a warranty, then the same is true if a 
physician expressed an opinion that a certain pre-
scription which he was willing to give to benefit 
one who was then ill and it proved that the medi-
cine did not improve his condition. Or if a lawyer 
expressed the opinion that he could win a suit, and 
that he thought certain defenses or tactics would 
bring about that result, and if despite the use of 
these tactics the suit failed, it would be for a jury 
to say whether, the suit not having been won, there 
was or was not a breach of warranty. 
uw e decline to hold this to be the state of the 
law either on what is a warranty or on what makes 
a jury question of alleged warranty." 
In Farrows v. Andrews, 69 Ala. 96, a representation 
was made by the seller of Guano that it was a good ferti-
lizer. Held, as a matter of law such statement is not 
warranty. 
In Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell and Braun Company 
(1939) 139 Maine 512, 3 Atl. (2d) 650, plaintiff asked 
the defendant's sales clerk for a particular brand of dress 
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shield. The clerk stated that the brand requested was no 
longer stocked but that the defendant had one very 
similar which was considered better. 
uThe new kind recently marketed was taking 
the place of (that one' (the shield asked for) * * * 
they have been chemically treated so that they can 
be washed and ironed out." 
The purchaser brought an action for damages as a 
result of inflammation of her skin. The court held that 
the statements were merely expressions of opinion, not 
of fact, and were not warranties. The Court said that 
expressions of opinion, no matter how strong, do not 
constitute warranties. 
In Micklen Tire Company v. Schultz, 295 Pa. St. 140, 
145 Atl. 67, the seller stated, among other things, that tires 
had given and should give an average of 3 6% more service 
than other good tires. The Court held as a matter of law 
that such a statement was not a warranty. 
The principle of these cases is applied in the Utah 
case of Detroit Vapor Stove Company v. ]. C. W eeter 
Lumber Company (1923), 61 Utah 503, 215 Pac. 995. 
In this case the seller stated that certain stoves and ovens 
were first class and would give first class satisfaction; that 
the buyers could not represent them too highly to their 
customers; that the sellers would stand by any recom-
mendations concerning the stoves, heaters and ovens as to 
their being first class; that they were the best and finest 
on the market; that anybody with ordinary intelligence 
could operate them successfully, and that the items would 
usell like hot cakes", and were far superior to anything 
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on the market. The Court held that all of these repre-
sentations were upuffing" and udealer's talk" -expressions 
of opinions and not warranties- as a matter of law. The 
principle is universally accepted. 
See the following illustrative cases holding that the 
described statements are not warranties: 
Chalmers v. Harding, 17 LT NS 571, that a reaping 
machine would ucut wheat, barley, etc., efficiently; Schroe-
ber v. Trubee, 35 Fed. 652 (C. C. Comm.), that dividends 
which had been declared on stock had been earned, and 
that the stock account was uall right"; Sleeper v. Wood, 
60 Fed. 888, 21 U. S. App. 127, 9 CCA 289 (CCA 1), 
that canned corn was of the ubest packing of 1888", 
accompanied with ((usual guarantee against swells"; Crosby 
v. Emerson, 142 Fed. 713, 74 CCA 45 (CCA 3), a state-
ment by the seller of mining stock in regard to the value 
of the property, with prophecies as to the projects of the 
company; Bain v. Withey, 107 Ala. 223, 18 So. 217, that a 
patented article was ((a valuable and useful improvement"; 
Pate v. ]. S. McWilliams Auto Co., 193 Ark. 620, 101 S.W. 
(2d) 794, that trucks would not consume more gasoline 
and oil than trucks traded in; Baldwin v. Daniel, 69 Ga. 
782, that a plow would ((sell well in Mississippi"; Towell 
v. Gatewood, 3 Ill. 22, 33 Am. Dec. 437, that a bill of 
sale described tobacco as ((good, first, and second rate to-
bacco"; Barrie v. Jerome, 112 Ill. App. 329, that Balzac's 
works were ((nice books" that ((children would love to 
read"; Shambraugh v. Current, 111 Iowa 121, 82 N. W. 
497, and Burnett v. Hensley, 118 Iowa 575, 92 N. W. 678, 
a description of animals as ((thoroughbred"; Gaar v. Hal-
verson, 128 Iowa 603, 105 N. W. 108, that an engine was 
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((practically as good as new" and was of sufficient power 
to drive defendant's machinery; Rowe Mfg. Co. v. Curtis-
Straub Co., 223 Iowa 858, 273 N. W. 895, that an article 
was far superior to others of the kind and would sell itself; 
McCullough v. Bales, 125 Kan. 670, 265 P. 1110, that 
a cow would calve the following March; Bryant v. Crosby, 
40 Me. 9, that ((sheep would shear from 3 to 5 pounds of 
wool per head, and that the buyer could pay for sheep by 
the wool from the sheep in two years and have wool left"; 
Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N. E. 107, 2 L.R.A. 
473. that a bond was ccan A-1 Bond"; Morley v. Consoli-
dated Mfg. Co., 196 Mass. 257, 81 N. E. 993, that a second-
hand automobile had been used as a demonstrator and had 
been run about 500 miles; that it was in first-class con-
dition and was all right; Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co. 
243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371, that cold cream was very 
good and very popular; that they sold a great deal of it 
and people did not find fault with it; Rosenbush v. 
Learned, 242 Mass. 297, 136 N. E. 341, that shoes are 
((prime elegant merchandise"; Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Peterman, 278 Mich. 615, 270 N. W. 807, that a gasoline 
stove was ufool proof"; Stumpp v. Lynbur, 84 N. Y. S. 
912, that roses ((were very fine stock"; St. Hubert's Guild 
v. Quinn, 64 N.Y. Misc. 336, 118 N.Y.S. 582, that Vol-
taire's works were ccfit for everybody to read"; Washburn-
Crosby Co. v. Kindervatter, 147 App. Div. 114, 131 
N.Y.S. 871, that flour ushould be as good as any made" and 
that the brand defendant had been using uwould not be 
in it" with this; Maggiros v. Edson, 164 N.Y.S. 377, that 
cheese is of uexcellent quality"; Kirsch v. Benyunes, 174 
N.Y.S. 794, 105 N. Y. Misc. 648, that chestnuts were of 
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ugood quality"; Harburger v. Stern, 189 N. Y. S. 74 
that a suit of clothes would ccwear like iron"; Cash 
Register Co. v. Townsend Grocery Store, 137 N. C. 
652, 50 S. E. 306, that a cash register ccwould do away 
with a bookkeeper"; uthat the books could be kept on 
the machine"; uthat the machine could be operated by 
a person of ordinary intelligence"; Dieterich v. Bartunek, 
38 Ohio App. 46, 175 N. E. 614, that programs from 
foreign countries could be received with a radio offered 
for sale; ·Gray v. Gurney, etc. Co., 57 S. D. 280, 231 
N. W. 940, that a certain seed corn would outyield 
any other variety that matures at the same time; that 
an agricultural machine would work ttin all kinds of 
hay, grain, straw and other grass." 
In the case at bar the trial court recognized, in part, 
the principle applied by the foregoing cases. At several 
places in the instructions it is mentioned that there must 
be a statement of fact to constitute a warranty. It is clear 
that the court felt that the statement as to 65% produc-
tion was a statement of fact and that all of the other state-
ments were simply matters of opinion and upuffing". 
In Instruction No. 13 the court says: 
uThe only oral representation that you may 
consider a warranty is the statement that Mintrate 
chickens on the self-feed plan had laid no less than 
65% production of eggs, if you find from the 
evidence that such a statement was made." 
In Instruction No. 11 the court said that if the state-
ment was, uthat the feed had been tried numerous times 
and it had never had less than 65% egg yield when the 
hens were fed Mintrate and in the self-feed manner", such 
WI 
ffii 
m: 
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a statement would constitute a warranty. To the same 
effect are Instructions 9, 10 and 12. 
Consideration must be given to the context of the 
alleged statement. The sum and substance of Barron's 
sales talk was that Mintrate 40 was a good feed; that it 
would save money by saving time and producing increased 
profits. (R. 128, 512) There is no doubt that such state-
ments as that a purchaser will save money and time, that 
it is a good feed, that it is the cheapest and best feed on the 
market, are all upuffing", and that they do not constitute 
warranties. Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. J. C. W eeter 
Lumber Co., supra, a Utah case, is squarely in point as to 
this proposition. The 65% statement, whatever it was, con-
sidered in this context certainly must be considered as sales 
talk and not as an express warranty. 
It is to be noted that the testimony of plaintiff and of 
his wife was not to the effect that Barron said there had 
never been less than 65% production, but rather that the 
feed had been used many times and proved to be successful, 
and that chickens using it would produce not less than 
65%. Park said the statement was, u* * * they would 
never lay below 65 per cent, and that there had been 
better results than that; that one woman was supposed to 
have got 90 per cent." (R. 127) Mrs. Park's version was, 
uit will make your chickens lay 65 per cent, or more" 
* * ~-. (R. 512) Barron's testimony as to the conversation 
comes somewhat closer to constituting a warranty than 
any other evidence, but Barron says in substance that he 
told Park that he had heard that birds using the feed and 
method had not laid under sixty-five per cent. Certainly 
this is not a representation of fact, even considered 
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alone. (Record 410.) Perhaps Barron had heard such 
statements. He specifically stated to Park that these 
representations were ((based on what I had heard-not 
that I had seen it personally or knew it personally myself." 
(Ibid) Then Barron told Park ((that he could expect to 
get sixty-five per cent or better :-.. * * ." 
Clearly, considering that these statements were inter-
mingled with matters that without question constitute 
mere ((puffing", they do not transcend the realm of 
opinion, speculation and sales talk. Park's understanding 
at the time was that they were no more. 
A statement as to what a feed will do is certainly dif-
ferent from a statement that ·certain results had always 
been achieved. It is submitted that, as a matter of law and 
under the testimony of these witnesses, especially that of 
the plaintiff, and his wife-the two persons most concerned 
in the decision-there was no evidence from which the 
jury could find that there had been a statement to the 
effect that there had never been less than 65% production, 
and that the court erroneously permitted this question 
to go to the jury in any manner. 
B. Park did not rely on any oral representation. 
We emphasize at this point that by making the argu-
ment that Park did not rely on any oral representaton, 
but instead relied upon the written guarantee made by 
Barron. Moorman Manufacturing Company does not in 
any sense or in any way ratify the writing or the authority 
of Barron to bind this company. Barron had no authority 
when he made the writing, and nothing that has been 
done by this defendant is a ratification of his unwarranted 
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act. We merely point out that Park did not in fact rely 
upon the oral statements made to him in purchasing the 
feed. 
Park states unequivocally that the so-called {{written 
guarantee" was intended to take the place of the oral 
statements. (R. 13 0) In Paragraph 6 of the complaint he 
says ttthat on or about the 19th day of June, 1948, the 
defendant Gail Barron did contact the plaintiff and at the 
request and insistence of the plaintiff did reduce the guar-
antee to writing, and that said guarantee is as follows, 
to-wit: * * *".At the trial the plaintiff insisted that that 
was what occurred. (Ibid.; R. 131) Park further testi-
fied: 
teAt the time I made the purchase, that was on 
this written guarantee, that was my whole claim. 
If he had not given me the written guarantee, I 
would not have bought the feed. It was supposed to 
refer to that. If I could have got a written guaran-
tee, I would feed the feed, but if I did not get it I 
would not feed it." (R. 133) 
He further testified: 
ttThen I said: ti can give you a chance to prove 
that feed, but I will want it in a written guarantee 
form. There will be no talk.' " ( R. 13 5) 
In connection with the statement concerning the 65%, 
Park was asked on cross-examination: 
uQ. Why didn't you buy the mintrate when he 
said that? * * * 
A. Well, I am hard to sell. 
Q. You mean by that that you did not believe 
his statement? 
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A. It seemed a little out of line, yes. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you refused to buy the 
mintrate until he gave you a written warranty? 
A. Until he promised to give me one, yes. 
Q. Did you ask for the written warranty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because verbal warranties are not too good." 
(R.l90) 
It is perfectly clear that Park did not rely upon the 
statement made by Barron but rather upon the written 
guarantee. He insisted on its execution from the begin-
ning, and he testified that ((There will be no talk", and he 
would not have bought the feed ex,cept for the writing. 
Where a representation of fact is alleged as an express 
warranty it is clear that the plaintiff must prove that he 
relied upon the statement before he can recover. (Willis-
ton on Sales, Rev. Ed. Sec. 2 0 6) 
Of course, in the ordinary case the buyer need not be 
especially concerned with this element of proof, since it 
may very often be presumed that he relied upon statements 
if they were of a kind which naturally would induce the 
purchase of goods. (Ibid.) Here, however, the buyer 
expressly states that he did not rely upon them but relied 
upon something else, viz: the writing, and that he would 
not have made the purchase except for the writing. Since 
there was no reliance on the alleged statement, it is 
clear that there ,can be no liability upon the theory of 
express warranty. 
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C. The Alleged Statement of Fact Submitted to the 
Jury as a Warranty was not proved to be untrue when 
made. 
There is a third compelling reason why the .case 
should not have gone to the jury on the theory that there is 
liability on the theory of an express warranty regarding 
65 7o production. The reason is that there was absolutely 
no evidence whatever which would permit an inference 
that such a statement, if made, was untrue. The Court 
recognized in its instructions that a representation of fact 
must be proved to be untrue for recovery upon the theory 
of express warranty. In Instruction No. 12 it stated: 
ulf you find that the defendant made a state-
ment of fact concerning the 65% egg yield based 
upon the use of Mintrate and the self-feed plan 
and that said statement of fact was untrue* * *" 
And in Instruction No. 9 the jury was told that plaintiff 
must be required to prove uthat such statement was false". 
In Instruction No. 15 the Court specifically stated that 
the plaintiff must prove, uthat the said representation 
of the numerous trials produce not less than 6 5% egg 
yield was false." 
The requirement made by the Court is, of course, a 
proper one. 
It is elementary that in the law of warranties, as in 
the law of fraud, plaintiff must prove the represented 
statement of fact to be untrue before recovery can be had. 
Blackstone states (3 Blackstone Commentaries, 165): 
((The warranties can only reach the things in 
being at the time of the warranty made, and not 
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the things in futuro; as, that a horse is sound at the 
buying of him, not that he will be sound two years 
hence." 
Professor Williston agrees that when recovery is on a 
warranty as a statement of fact, the statement must be 
proved to be untrue. (See Williston on Sales, Sec. 211, 
Rev. Ed. Vol. 1, P. 548) 
The error here complained of is that there is absolutely 
no evidence from which the jury could infer that such a 
statement, if made, was untrue. There is not a word of 
evidence in the entire record from which the jury could 
infe,r, even if Gail Barron told Park that no less than 65% 
production had ever been attained, that this statement 
was not true. No attempt was made to offer any such 
evidence; in fact, there is no evidence whatever in the 
record as to any results before the time that the alleged 
statement was made. That evidence was introduced tend-
ing to show several unsuccessful uses after the statement 
was made does not tend to show that less than 65% was 
attained before the statement . 
. Again, the Court's attention is invited to the fact that 
chicken raising is a highly precarious and speculative oc-
cupation. Chickens die or fail to produce without any 
observable cause. Chickens purchased at the same time and 
raised under identical conditions, being cared for side by 
side in similar groups, often prosper or fail without dis-
cernible reason. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
such factors as heredity, feed, light, wind and disease 
greatly affect chickens. 
Mr. Barker's testimony that his use of Mintrate was 
successful is clear, convincing and unimpeached. Certainly, 
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it cannot be contended that an inference can be made from 
the testimony of plaintiff's unsuccessful users, all after 
Gail Barron's statement, to the fact which plaintiff was 
bound to prove that there were unsuccessful users prior 
to the time the statement was made. It is to be noted that 
plaintiff had more than a year to get his evidence; that 
defendant's feed has been used throughout the United 
States, and that he did not produce one witness to testify 
that less than 65 ro production was achieved before June 1, 
1948. This element was part of plaintiff's case. It is his 
burden to prove it. The complete failure of his evidence 
is fatal to the theory of express warranty. 
For the reasons, then, that there was no statement of 
fact made to the plaintiff, no oral representation was 
relied upon by him, and if a statement of fact was made 
it was not proved to be true, the Court erred in permitting 
the jury to consider the theory of express warranties. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO FIND 
EITHER (a) THAT BARRON HAD EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY WARRANTY WHATSOEVER CON-
CERNING DEFENDANT'S FEED, OR (B) THAT MOORMAN 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY RATIFIED ANY STATEMENT 
OR WARRANTY MADE BY BARRON, OR (c) THAT MOORMAN 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY WAS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE 
AUTHORITY OF BARRON TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT OR 
WARRANTY. 
-~ Under the Court's instructions, the jury was author-
ized in finding either that there was express or implied 
·· authority for Barron to warrant defendant's feed, and 
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particularly to represent that it had been tried ttnumerous 
times and had always produced 65 eggs per one hundred 
hens per day", or that the ,company ratified the statements, 
if any, made by Barron to Park, or that the company was 
estopped to deny the authority of Barron to make any 
such statement (see Instructions Nos. I, 2, I 0, II and I5) . 
We shall point out that under the facts of this case and the 
law applicable to these facts, it was error to submit the 
case to the jury on any one of these three possibilities 
concerning agency. 
(a) There was no express authority to make any state-
ments as warranties; there was no implied authority to 
make a.ny such statements inasmuch as the proof by both 
plaintiff and defendant is unequivocal and clear that such 
statements as are relied on by the plaintiff are unusual 
and not customary. 
The principle is perfectly clear that express authority 
must come in a direct line from the board of directors. 
The power to warrant would be delegated through the 
officers and appropriate employees to Barron. Plaintiff, 
of ,course, proved no resolution of the board. Instead of 
starting with the top and working down, plaintiff proved 
that Barron had no authority, but that he contacted the 
state manager, McArthur. McArthur testified that he 
contacted the district manager, McCullough. McCullough 
denied that McArthur contacted him, and although Mc-
Arthur testified that he made a telephone call to McCul-
lough's residence in Idaho, the telephone company records 
did not show any such call. (R. 745) There is no question, 
however, that the attempt to prove as to authority went no 
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further than McCullough. A director and western sales 
manager for the area, including Utah, Mr. Claude Holmes, 
testified that the board of directors of Moorman Manu-
facturing Company had never authorized any written or 
oral warranties or guarantees, and that there was a com-
pany policy to the effect that no such statements or war-
ranties were permitted, and that if any authority were 
given by the company to any salesman in Utah, it would 
come through him. (R. 611-614) 
There is no evidence in the record, except the testimony 
of Mr. Holmes, with respect to whether or not any author-
ity was given by the corporation. Certainly his testimony 
is unimpeached, and there is nothing from which the jury 
could presume that there is any express authority for a 
salesman to make the kind of statements made to Park. 
Nor was there any implied authority. 
The rule is stated as follows in the Restatement of the 
Law of Agency, Sec. 63, Comment ((C" on Subsection 
( 1) : 
((In the absence of a usage or other indication 
of the principal's consent to do so, an agent author-
ized to sell either land or goods is not authorized 
to make promises as to the present or future exist-
ence of a fact in connection with the sale. If there 
is a usage, however, to give a warranty upon the 
sale of a particular subject matter, authority to 
give such a warranty is ordinarily inferred from 
authority to sell, if th~ agent has no notice that the 
warranty cannot be performed." 
The same section, illustration 2, is as follows: 
up authorizes A to sell a shipment of P's flour 
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in State X and vicinity. It is the usage in making 
the sales in X to warrant that the flour is sweet and 
fresh. A makes the sale toT in X ,warranting (1) 
that the flour is sweet and fresh, and (2) that it 
will remain fresh and sweet after a voyage in the 
tropics. A is authorized to make the first warranty 
but not the second." 
The law is settled that a principal is not bound by the 
acts or statements of his agent when the agreement to sell 
is upon unusual terms or conditions, or when the state-
ments made are unusual and not customary in the trade. 
Particularly where the evidence shows that there is a 
custom not to warrant a particular kind of goods, the 
statements of the salesman as to the quality or attributes 
of the goods do not bind the principal. Illustrative cases 
follow: 
In john Stimber & Co. v. Keene, 152 S. W. 661 
(Texas), the Court said: 
ult is there held (referring to Friedman & Son 
v. Kelly, hereafter referred to) that the principal 
is not bound by the acts of the agent in agreeing 
to sell upon unusual terms on condition, unless it 
is shown that such authority is given the agent. 
When the sale~man proposes terms or conditions 
of payment so unusual as those urged in this case 
by the defendants, it may be assumed as a matter 
of law that they are not within the apparent scope 
of the authority commonly conferred upon and 
exercised by travelling salesmen. To agree as a con-
sideration for the purchase of new goods that the 
seller will take in payment the unsold portion of an 
old stock that had been on hand for nearly a year 
would seem at least to be so uncommon an offer 
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that the purchaser might well question the author-
ity of the agent to make it. The power to sell per-
sonal property does not presumptively carry with it 
the power to barter or to take over stock in part 
payment. That proposition is so well settled by 
authority no citations are necessary." 
In Morse v. Illinois Power & Light Corporation, 14 
N. E. {2d) 259, 294 Ill. App. 498, an agent of the defend-
ant sold certain stock to plaintiff, and agreed to repurchase 
the stock. The Court said: 
((However, a mere holding out of an agent as 
having authority to sell stock and collect for the 
same does not carry with it an implication that he 
also possesses authority to make a repurchase agree-
ment or to agree on behalf of his principal that the 
money will be returned if the purchaser is not 
satisfied with the stock at any time in the future. 
An agent who is authorized merely to sell person-
alty and collect and turn over the money for the 
same is not empowered to bind the principal by an 
agreement to repurchase the property, which 
promise is made by the agent as an inducement to 
the consummation of the sale." 
The case of Chas. E. Morris & Co. v. Bynum Bros., 93 
So. 467, 207 Ala. 541, is concerned specifically with the 
power of an agent to bind his principal as to warranties. 
The Court quoted 2 Corpus Juris, 605, and stated: 
uThe implied power of an agent to warrant 
title and guaranty rests upon the necessity and pro-
priety of such warranties in the sale of goods. It 
is not, therefore, to be extended to other warranties 
of an unusual sort, however impossible the agent 
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may find it to make a sale without giving such 
warranty." 
The alleged warranty was that the plaintiff would take the 
clothes off the hands of the defendants at the sale price 
in certain situations. 
In Beck v. Freund, 117 N. Y. Supp. 193, the Court, 
speaking through Judge Lehman, said: 
Hit is well settled that an agent has not general 
authority merely through his employment as a 
salesman to sell goods upon extraordinary terms, 
and certainly not to consign goods of his employer 
upon such terms as Myers attempted to give here." 
The Court then discussed whether a certain telephone con-
versation was sufficient as ratification under the facts of 
the case, and held that it was not. 
Similarly, in Tollerton & Warfield Co. v. Gilruth, 112 
N. W. 842, 21 S. D. 320, a salesman sold sugar and pur-
portedly executed a secret rebate slip which reduced the 
price below the market value when the sugar was pur-
chased. The Court said: 
uSuch traveling representatives of wholesale 
dealers are usually clothed with power to solicit 
sales and take orders at the market value, so when, 
as in this case, a reasonable price consistent with 
current quotations is prescribed by the wholesaler, 
the representative has no authority, implied or 
otherwise, to enter into a secret agreement to sell 
for less, and the attempt to do so, when considered 
with the fact that the private memorandum at var-
iance with the order was signed in his individual 
capacity, and did not purport to bind anyone but 
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himself, was sufficient to put a purchaser on in-
quiry." 
In Rubin v. As!Uns, 204 N. Y. Supp. 827, 123 Misc. 
Rep. 155, the plaintiff sued to recover the agreed purchase 
price of certain merchandise consisting of coats. The 
defendant resisted payments on the theory that the plain-
tiff's salesman had told defendant that defendant need not 
return these coats but if by the end of the season defendant 
had not been able to dispose of them plaintiff would accept 
their return. The Court said: 
nThis alleged agreement on the part of the 
salesman was denied. The authority of the sales-
man to make such an agreement, assuming that it 
was made, was not shown. There was no proof that 
plaintiff knew of this alleged agreement, or that 
he had in any way ratified it. The right to make 
such an agreement is not incidental to a salesman's 
selling authority. A salesman has no implied powers 
beyond that which is usual and necessary to bring 
about the sale. The court erred in charging the 
jury that the salesman (being the only person with 
whom the transaction was made, any terms agreed 
upon between the two were binding; ~· * * that 
there is no question of the authority of the sales-
man. Any agreement made between him and the 
defendant was binding.' " 
In Churchill Grain & Seed Co., Inc. v. Buchman, 197 
N.Y. S. 552, 204 App. Div. 30, a carload of oats was sold 
by defendant and was to be shipped in June, but it was 
in fact not shipped until July 8th. On July 19th the 
plaintiff's salesman, one Gusman, called upon the defend-
ant and told him that if he took the car, any loss would 
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be taken care of by the plaintiff. Gusman and plaintiff's 
treasurer both testified that he had no authority to make 
such a statement. The jury, however, found that he had 
implied authority. The Court cites 2 Corpus Juris 607, 
708, as follows: 
((Ordinarily a sales agent is supposed to be em-
ployed to contract a sale and has no implied power 
once this is done, either to undo or to modify the 
contract." 
The Court says: 
ttl think that is a correct statement of the law 
in the absence of any evidence of custom. Here 
nothing further appears than that the agent was 
empowered to sell at prices named hy the plaintiff. 
His statement, made to the defendant long after 
the order was taken, that the seller would stand the 
loss if the defendant would take in the car and 
pay for it, was made entirely without authority, 
insofar as the record discloses, and was not binding 
on the plaintiff. One dealing with an agent is 
bound to inquire as to the extent of his authority 
and the burden of proof was upon the defendant 
to establish the authority of the agent to make the 
agreement that the plaintiff would stand the loss. 
There is no evidence in the case which justified 
the submission of that question to the jury." 
The case of Friedman & Sons v. Kelly, 102 S. W. 
1066, 126 Mo. App. 279, contains instructive language: 
((This responsibility of the principal for the 
acts of his agent, not expressly authorized, is lim-
ited, however, to such acts as are within the ap-
parent scope of the authority conferred; that is 
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to say, it is implied, of course, that an agent on the 
road, such as a traveling salesman, for the sale of 
goods to various dealers, has the authority to employ 
all necessary and proper means for the accomplish-
ment of the sale which are justified by and con-
sistent with the usages of trade. Or, to state the 
proposition in other language, the law presumes, 
and those dealing with the agent have the right to 
act upon the presumption of law, that the agent is 
authorized to sell the goods in the usual manner 
and only in the usual manner, and make such con-
tracts thereabout as are reasonable or comport with 
the usage and custom of the trade in like undertak-
ings, and it is to this extent, and this extent only, 
that an agent may be said as a matter of law to be 
acting within the scope of his apparent authority. 
Story on Age~cy ( 2d Ed.) Sec. 60; Tiffany on 
Agency, Sees. 45-47; Benjamin on Sales (6th Ed.) 
Sec. 624; 6 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 
224; Wharton on Agency, Sec. 189; Mechem on 
Agency, Sees. 350-362; 1 Clark & Skyles on Agen-
cy, Sec. 244; Upton v. Suffolk County Mills, 11 
Cush. (Mass.) 586, 59 Am. Dec. 163. 
ccNow, in keeping with the principles thus 
stated, it was determined by our Supreme Court 
in Palmer v. Hatch, 46 Mo. 585, that while a travel-
ing salesman on the road, with general authority to 
sell whiskies for his principal, had authority to 
employ the usual modes and means of accomplish-
ing the sale, and sufficient to warrant the quality 
and condition of the whiskey sold, an unusual war-
ranty, such as to warrant against any seizure of 
the article for violation of the revenue laws, may 
not be included within the limits of the apparent 
scope of the authority of such agency. And, so, too, 
in Butter v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298, 30 Am. Rep. 795, 
it was held that the authority of an agent selling 
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by sample and on credit, but not intrusted with the 
possession of the goods to be sold, could not be ex-
tended so as to authorize him to bind his principal 
by receiving payment for the goods under the doc-
trine of apparent authority. And so too in Cham-
bers v. Short, 79 Mo. 204, it was adjudged that the 
apparent authority of a canvassing agent for the 
sale of books by subscription, to be afterwards 
delivered, did not include authority to receive pay-
ment for such books to be subsequently delivered 
and not then in his possession. And likewise the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Upton v. 
Suffolk County Mills, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 586, 59 
Am. Dec. 163, adjudged that it was not within 
the apparent authority of an agent selling flour 
to bind his principal by a warranty that the flour 
sold by him on the account of his principal would 
keep sweet during a sea voyage, in the absence of 
a usage or custom of the business to that effect. As 
a correlative of the principle which affixes the 
limitation of the rule with respect to the apparent 
authority of an agent, as above indicated, there is 
another and companion principle which enforces a 
reasonable degree of diligence upon those who deal 
with the agent in relying upon his apparent rather 
than his exp_ress authority to bind the principal; and 
that is the person dealing with the agent, although 
ever so innocent, will not be permitted to ignore 
all the precepts of common sense pointing contrari-
wise and rely exclusively upon the representations 
or promises of the agent, however unreasonable, for 
the law with respect to every relation of life not 
involving intentional fraud or malice, as we under-
stand it, sets up an ordinarily prudent man as the 
standard by which the conduct and affairs of other 
men should be governed, and in consonance with 
this standard a person dealing with an agent is re-
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quired to act with ordinary prudence and reason-
able diligence. Therefore, if the authority which 
the traveling salesman assumes to exercise in and 
about the consummation of the sale of such goods 
is of such an unusual, improbable, and extraordi-
nary character as would be sufficient to place a 
reasonably prudent business man in dealing with 
him, upon his guard, the party so dealing will not 
be justified in disregarding his senses and overlook-
ing the real situation, and thereafter seek to hold 
the principal, upon the theory of the agent's ap-
parent authority. Under such circumstances, it is 
the duty of the party dealing with the agent to 
either refuse to close negotiations with him at all 
or first proceed to ascertain from the principal 
whether the true scope of his authority is such as 
will authorize the extraordinary and unusual con-
tract proposed. The principal last mentioned, not 
only comports with the ends of justice sought to 
be attained by the established law of principal and 
agent, but it is in fact one of the fundamentals of 
our entire system of jurisprudence, and is as sound 
as the Rock of Ages. 1 Clark & Skyles on Agency, 
Sec. 210; Mechem on Agency, Sees. 291-362; 
Wharton on Agency, Sec. 13 7; 6 Amer. & Eng. 
Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 244, et seq. Mechem on 
Agency, 350-362." 
The Court then pointed out that the buyer himself 
regarded the salesman's proposition as unusual; yet he did 
nothing to ascertain his authority. His defense to an ac-
tion for the price was held invalid. 
In Central Commercial Co. v. Lebon, 173 Ill. App. 27, 
the Court said: 
uThe only authority that is implied from the 
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mere fact of agency is cto sell in the usual manner 
and only in the usual manner in which the goods 
or tl~ings of that sort are sold.' " 
See also Ide v. Brody, 156 Ill. App. 479, and George 
DeWit.t Shoe Co. v. Adkins, 98 S. E. 209, 83 W.Va. 267. 
The principle of these cases is recognized in George B. 
Leavitt Co. v. Couturier, 23 Pac. (2d) 1101, 82 Ut. 256, 
where Mr. Justice Elias Hansen, speaking for the court, 
said: 
((The apparent power of an agent is to be deter-
mined by the acts of the principal and not by the 
acts of the agent; a principal is responsible for the 
acts of an agent within the apparent authority 
only where the principal himself by his acts or con-
duct has clothed the agent with the appearance of 
authority, and not where the agent's own conduct 
has created the apparent authority." 
The general rule is clear, and the Utah Supreme Court 
has specifically held, that a person dealing with an agent 
is bound at his peril to determine the agent's authority. 
Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc., 99 
Utah 188, 103 Pac. (2d) 650. 
The case of Royal Seed and Milling Co. v. Thorne 
( 1928) 142 Miss. 92, 102 So. 282, stands for the proposi-
tion that an agent has no implied authority to warrant 
the soundness of animal foods for a given period of time, 
especially where the orders are transmitted to the principal 
for approval. 
The rule that an unusual or extraordinary statement by 
a salesman is not within the scope of his employment is 
stated by Mechem on Agency, 2nd. Ed., Vol. 1, Pages 63 5, 
636, Sec. 889. That the rule is sound in principle appears 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
to be uncontradicted in the cases. No reason exists to dis-
tinguish between cases where a written warranty is made 
and cases where there is an attempt to recover upon an 
alleged express warranty as a statement of fact. 
A salesman, for example, as a matter of principle, 
should be no more able in law to bind his employer by stat-
ing to a prospective customer that an automobile will last 
for fifty years, or that all automobiles of this kind have 
lasted in the past for fifty years, than to give a written 
guarantee stating that the company would stand back of 
its product and guarantee it lasting fifty years. Under 
the provisions of the Sales Act relating to express warran-
ties the seller is no less liable in one situation than the other 
if agency is established, assuming, of course, that all the 
conditions relating to express warranty are satisfied. 
The policy of the law certainly is not, under these cir-
cumstances, to penalize an employer by holding him liable 
for oral statements of his salesmen when admittedly writ-
ten warranties of the same tenor and to the same effect 
would not be binding upon him. The law which affords 
certain protection to purchasers must and does give sanct-
uary to a seller whose salesmen make extraordinary or un-
usual statements concerning seller's product. 
The importance of these principles as applied to the 
case at bar is that here the evidence is uncontradicted on 
both sides that the giving of a warranty of any kind by a 
feed company is unusual. The plaintiff himself stated that 
he has been in the chicken business for eighteen years. 
(R. 120) During that time he was engaged in business in 
Riverton. On cross-examination he stated that it was 
unusual for a feed company to give a written guarantee, 
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(R. 190) and that no other feed company has ever given 
him an oral guarantee, or written guarantee. (R. 191) 
He further testified that during this period of time he 
had never heard of any other person receiving an oral or 
written guarantee from any other feed company. (R. 191) 
One of plaintiff's witnesses was Mr. Earl Wood, a resident 
of Salt Lake City, and an employee of General Mills Farm 
Service Division. (R. 3 52 et seq.) He has been in field 
work for General Mills for ten years. (R. 353) His testi-
mony is that General Mills is one of the largest feed com-
panies in the country. (R. 3 53) He stated upon cross-
examination that he has never before seen a guarantee of 
the kind Barron allegedly gave Park. (R. 385.) 
For the defendant, Mr. Claude Holmes of Quincy, 
Illinois, testified that he is an officer and director of the 
Moorman Manufacturing Company and that the company 
does an annual business in excess of twenty-five million 
dollars. He was western sales manager and his terri tory 
included everything west of the west half of Nebraska, 
South Dakota and North Dakota to the Pacific Coast. 
There was no authority given to any agents or employees 
of this defendant to make any written or oral guarantees 
or warranties of any kind whatsoever. (R. 611-613) Mr. 
Holmes is acquainted with the custom of other feed com-
panies in the United States, and stated that as far as he 
knows no other company makes such a guarantee or auth-
orizes such warranties as was allegedly made to Park by 
Barron in this case. 
The fact of the matter is that there is a custom to the 
effect that no warranty is given by feed companies. There 
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is not a word of evidence in the entire record of this case, 
except that giving of warranties of the kind allegedly given 
by Barron to Park here is unusual and was unusual during 
the period of time in question. 
It is therefore clear that Gail Barron had no authority, 
express or implied, to make such a representation of fact 
as is relied upon by the plaintiff in this action. The law 
puts one dealing with an agent on inquiry as to the extent 
of the agent's authority. The plaintiff knew at the time 
he bought the feed, and at all times prior thereto and sub-
sequent thereto, that Barron was making an unusual kind 
of proposition to him. He was bound to ascertain Barron's 
authority at his peril, and he was not permitted to rely 
upon Barron's statements as to what that authority was. 
The statements were made beyond the scope of· Barron's 
employment and are therefore not binding upon the de-
fendant Moorman Manufacturing Company. 
(b) Defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company is 
not bound by the statements or representations of fact, if 
any, of Barron on the theory of ratification. 
In Instructions Nos. 10 and 15 the Court in effect 
authorized the jury to find for the plaintiff upon the 
theory that defendant feed company ratified the state-
ments of Gail Barron. The Court said that if the defendant 
company knew of an oral warranty, and thereafter accept-
ed orders for feed or payment for feed without notifying 
plaintiff that it did not intend to be bound by the war-
ranty as it was made, then the defendant was bound never-
:J theless. The Court also stated that if the company ac-
;e: cepted any benefit from the sale of mintrate after receiv-
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ing knowledge of the oral warranty, without repudiating 
it, then the company was estopped to deny Barron's auth-
ority. 
It may be that these are correct principles of law in the 
abstract, but there was certainly no evidence to justify the 
submitting of the case to the jury on this theory in the case 
at bar. There is not an iota of evidence in the record, and 
in fact there was none produced or offered at the trial, 
which as much as suggested that the Moorman Manufac-
turing Company at any time accepted any benefit from 
the Park contract, or any other contract made by Barron. 
There is not a word to show that the Park feed was ever 
paid for. There is nothing to show the acceptance of any 
benefits after the matter came to the attention of the com-
pany. 
The first time the company had any direct knowledge 
of the guarantee allegedly made in this case was when 
Roger Mittelberg talked with Barron on August 28th at 
the Newhouse Hotel in Salt Lake City. Mittelberg had 
been here on July 19th, but at that time neither he nor 
Park nor anyone else told him that there was an agreement 
of the kind made and claimed for in this action. (R.797-
79 8) When Barron told Mittel berg of this agreement Mit-
tel berg immediately went out to Park's farm and conferred 
with him about the situation. (R. 799) At that time Park 
told Mittelberg that Barron had sent a copy to the com-
pany. Mittelberg said that was the first he knew of it, and 
he was permitted to make a copy. (R.799, 800) At that 
time Mittelberg told Park in no uncertain terms directly 
and unequivocably that Barron had no authority to make 
any such agreement or representation. (R. 800) Subse-
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quently Mittelberg wrote McArthur and told him that 
he had no authority to make a guarantee. ( R. 8 0 1) 
The plaintiff himself hedges somewhat as to what 
Mittelberg told him in this conversation, but he testifies 
that he got the impression, because of what Mittelberg 
said, that the company was not going to be bound by Bar-
ron's actions. (R. 205, 209, 240) The Mittelberg-Park 
conversation was on August 28th. Park had discontinued 
the feed at that time. (R. 148) In September plaintiff's 
counsel wrote to the company and notified it that he was 
representing Park in the action that resulted. (R. 240) 
Barron himself stated that he never sold any feed after 
this Park-Mittelberg conversation. (R. 448) 
The subject of ratification by a principal of acts of an 
agent is treated in the Restatement of the Law of Agency, 
Vol. 1, Chap. 4, Sees. 82 to 104. There is no question that 
the whole theory of ratification is built on knowledge by 
the principal of the agent's act and his accepting of the 
benefits of the act or making some manifestation of con-
sent to it, although the agent originally lacked authoriza-
tion for it. We believe the principle is sufficiently clear 
that no authority need be cited. The plaintiff in this case 
proved nothing to justify the submitting of the action 
to the jury on ratification theories. The instructions of 
the Court, therefore, that the jury could make a finding 
that there was ratification were manifestly prejudicial 
error. 
(c) There was no jus.tification for submitting this 
case to the jury upon the theory that the Moorman Manu-
facturing Company is estopped to deny liability for the 
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statements of Ba.rron, or for his authority to make any 
statements or warranties allegedly on behalf of this defend. 
ant. 
Insofar as the basic theory of estoppel is distinguished 
from the theory of ratification in agency law the estoppel 
idea is that a principal has held an agent out through a 
course of dealings so that one dealing with him relied on 
his authority to represent the agent in given kinds of trans-
actions. The principal then discharges the agent but fails 
to notify persons dealing with him. Under such a situation 
it is held that the principal is estopped to deny the agent's 
authority. 
Under the facts of this case there is absolutely no basis 
for submitting to the jury the proposition that defendant 
is bound by a theory of estoppel. The Court apparently 
intended to submit the estoppel idea in Instruction No. 11, 
where it stated that if Barron was given instructions in 
sales meetings as to the selling points of the defendant's 
feed, and Barron made representations to the plaintiff 
along the lines of his instructions, ((and if * * ::- plaintiff 
purchased the feed because of said statements and reliance 
thereon, then you are informed that the defendant com-
pany is estopped to deny the agent's authority and is bound 
by the representation." It is submitted that the doctrine 
of estoppel has absolutely no basis whatsoever on this set 
of facts. 
The Court also refers to estoppel in Instruction No. 
10. There is no situation here that justifies the jury to 
consider the estoppel question. Plaintiff was not induced 
to purchase this feed by the defendant's holding the agent 
out as his a~thorized representative and then cutting him 
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off without notifying the plaintiff. The matter of estop-
pel should not have been submitted. 
The fact is that the Court went out of its way to sub-
mit any conceivable hypothesis to the jury whether it was 
justified or not. The net effect was to overstress defend-
ant's liability. Insofar as the question of implied author-
ity is involved, it is discussed under subheading (a) of this 
heading. Insofar as the question of ratification is involved, 
it is discussed under subheading (b). 
The Court committed error in telling the jury that the 
defendant was guilty of acts which estopped it from deny-
ing Barron's authority in this case. The error, moreover, 
was not simply a harmless one. It had the tendency tore-
emphasize and reiterate to the jury that the defendant 
was liable on one theory or another. The purpose of in-
structions is to aid the jury in reaching a proper decision, 
not to confuse it. Certainly the question of estoppel here 
was not involved, and the submitting of the question 
only confused and misled the jury. Certainly it was pre-
judicial to defendant's rights to have the matter explained 
in estoppel terms. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT IS 
LIABLE IN THE THEORY OF BREACH OF EXPRESS AND IM-
PLIED WARRANTIES AS TO THE METHOD OF FEEDING AS 
DISTINGUISHED FROM THE FEED ITSELF. 
In Instructions Nos. 4, 9, 14 and 15 the Court states 
in effect that liability on the warranty idea exists whether 
the feed or the method of feeding was the cause of plaintiff's 
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unfortunate result. The Court refused to distinguish be-
tween the theories of recovery with reference solely to the 
feed, and statements made concerning the feed made by 
plaintiff and the statement as to the method or procedure 
of feeding. 
When a method or procedure of conduct is suggested 
or recommended, the speaker is liable, if at all, on different 
theories than those that arise in the case of the sale of a 
chattel. 
The Court's attention is invited to the decision in 
DeZeeuw v. Fox Chemical Co. (1920), 189 Iowa 1195, 
179 N. W. 605, where the Court said: 
uif on this it may go to the jury whether there 
has been a warranty, then the same is true if a 
physician expressed an opinion that a certain pre-
scription which he was willing to give to benefit 
one who was then ill and it proved that the medi-
cine did not improve his condition. Or if a lawyer 
expressed the opinion that he could win a suit, and 
that he thought certain defenses or tactics would 
bring about that result, and if despite the use of 
these tactics the suit failed, it would be for a jury 
to say whether, the suit not having been won, there 
was or was not a breach of warranty." 
Certainly the advice of a man engaged in a profession 
could not possibly precipitate an action unless there were 
pleaded and proved the elements of fraud or negligence. 
Why, then, would there be any liability if one· who does not 
pretend to be giving expert advice makes suggestions as to 
procedure? 
The matter of warranty as it is concerned in this case 
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involves personal property; in fact, the Uniform Sales Act 
is applicable only to goods and chattels, and Section 76 of 
the Act defines the classes of goods subject to its provisions. 
An idea or procedure or method is not subject to the Act. 
These are simply intangibles, the only reality of which lies 
in their application to physical things. If, therefore, 
Mr. Optimistic tells me a way in which I can make a 
million dollars and I follow his directions with the result 
that I am bankrupt, I am not entitled to recover. Similarly, 
if Mr. Efficiency Expert outlines a method of production 
which he says will cut operating costs in half, and the 
method fails, there can be no breach of warranty. 
The law encourages the expression of opinion and 
the dissemination of ideas to such a degree that a person 
bringing an action upon statements such as these, cannot 
hope to recover-certainly not on a warranty theory-
even if it is proved that the idea or method or procedure 
recommended is basically unsound. 
If, therefore, plaintiff's trouble was caused by the 
method suggested by Barron, as distinguished from feed, 
there can be no recovery for breach of warranty. The 
difference in the theories of liability as to chattels and ideas 
is of particular importance in this case, because plaintiff's 
own witnesses testified that the method was the cause of 
plaintiff's difficulties. Park himself testified that his 
theory was that the method of feeding caused the loss, and 
that is the theory of this lawsuit. (R. 238-239) Plaintiff 
had the feed itself analyzed (R. 238), but no facts what-
soever tended to show either that the feed contains dele-
terious substances or that the proportion of the contents 
are not as represented by the company. There is no proof 
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that the contents in the proportions found in the feed are 
not proper and beneficial for chickens. The only possi-
bility remaining, if defendant is to be kept in the case at all, 
is the method of feeding. Since under plaintiff's theory 
the method was the proximate cause, and since there is no 
such thing as an express warranty as to methods or other 
intangibles, the plaintiff .cannot recover on this theory. 
The Court not only submitted the cause to the jury 
on the theory that there could be a breach of an express 
warranty as to the method, but stated as well that there 
was an implied warranty. (See Instructions Nos. 9, 14 and 
15; R. 88) What kind of a creature would that be? The 
Sales Act admittedly implies certain warranties as to the 
sale of goods under certain circumstances, but that warran-
ties could not possibly be implied in the sale or communica-
tion of a naked idea-an intangible that has no substance. 
Defendant requested an instruction to express this idea, but 
his request was refused. (R. 71) 
It is submitted that the Court committed gross error 
in permitting the .case to go to the jury on these theories. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
THE INFERENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S LOSS, IF HE HAD ANY, 
WAS THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE USE OF EITHER 
POULTRY MINTRATE 40 OR THE SELF-FEED METHOD OF 
FEEDING, OR BOTH. 
It is, of course, elementary that plaintiff must estab-
lish by competent and substantial evidence that his loss 
was proximately caused by a violation of duty to him by 
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defendant. In the case at bar defendant has insisted 
throughout the proceedings that any loss of production 
or deaths in plaintiff's chickens was caused by factors other 
than defendant's feed and self-feed method. The question 
of proximate cause assumes importance in this case be-
cause all the witnesses who pretended to know anything 
about chickens testified without hesitation that there 
are numerous causes of sickness and death in the poultry 
business. 
Plaintiff's own experience in the six-month period 
following March 1, 1948, demonstrates the numerous 
hazards he encountered. His chickens had chicken -pox, 
tracheitis, pullorum, big liver and Newcastle during this 
period of time. In addition, he was concerned about the 
picking in his flocks before egg production started. (R. 
179, 18 0) In fact, his testimony discloses that the first 
thing he bought through Barron was a supply of minerals 
to try to stop this picking. (Ibid.) 
Plaintiff's other witnesses had similar difficulties. 
Dan Damjanovich had Newcastle in his flocks (R. 469, 
483, 485); Gail Smith had Newcastle and picking (R. 
460). His testimony is that the birds just died. Apparent-
ly he did not know what was the matter with them. (Ibid.) 
Earl Sorensen testified that his chickens were fed scratch 
and oats every day and fed the quantity of mintrate 
prescribed and cleaned up all the feed, and yet they starved 
to death. (R. 496-8) 
Chicken men are constantly threatened by perils and 
disease and hereditary factors which are not- easily dis-
cernible. One cannot read the testimony of plaintiff's 
witness Conta, who had been in the chicken business for 
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some thirty years, without realizing that the poultry busi-
ness is precarious and uncertain and that poultrymen them-
selves often do not know what causes the difficulties. His 
testimony is that chickens in two pens, with similar here-
dity, fed on the same kind of feed by the same person, 
and for all intents and purposes treated the same way, have 
very different results. One pen may prosper, while another 
pen may be afflicted with pickouts or disease or may go 
into a moult without apparent reason. (R. 341) The 
testimony of the plaintiff himself is to the same effect. 
(R. 192-193) 
Under these circumstances, in considering the un-
certainties involved, and especially considering the lack 
of proof in the case, the question of proximate cause 
deserves serious consideration. 
Consideration should be given to the fact that plain-
tiff was well pleased with the early results. Egg production 
went up to 63Yz% in the mintrate pens. (R. 147) The 
important fact is there was picking in his flocks before he 
used the mintrate and self-feed method. (R. 179-180) 
Plaintiff did not have a veterinary examine the birds at any 
time, even though he consulted counsel as early as Sep-
tember, 1948, and kept the chickens for more than a year 
after that time. Plaintiff produced no expert testimony 
of any kind. There is nothing from which the jury could 
infer that the self-feed method is not basically sound. 
There is nothing from which it could infer that there is 
any deleterious substance in defendant's feed, or that the 
substances in the proportions named and guaranteed by 
defendant are not nutritional. Plaintiff, in fact, reduces 
his own position to an absurdity when he testifies in effect 
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that despite the fact these chickens ate the mintrate, ate 
the oats and scratch placed before them in the proportions 
named, and had oats before them at all times, they starved 
to death. Certainly evidence of this kind does not reach 
the dignity of competent, substantial evidence such as 
justifies recovery. The mere fact that an event occurs 
after another event does not mean that the one was the 
proximate cause of the other. 
Plaintiff's position is almost as ridiculous as that of 
the man who decided he was going to try an experiment to 
see what it was that was making him get drunk. The man 
mixed rye and soda, then Scotch and soda, then Bourbon 
and soda, then a blend and soda, and each time the man 
became precariously inebriated. He decided that since 
soda was present in each of the combinations, it was the 
soda that made him drunk. 
If this appears to be facetious, it is nevertheless sub-
mitted that there is no more scientific proof by the plain-
tiff in this action. Neither on principles of inductive nor 
deductive logic can plaintiff be heard to say that his evi-
dence is sufficient. 
Only three other chicken raisers besides plaintiff testi-
fied in this case as to results obtained. These are Dan 
Damjanovich, H. Gail Smith and Earl Sorensen. It is 
important to notice the kind of statements made by these 
men on the witness stand. They all testified only that 
they followed defendant's directions in using the feed. 
Some of them could not remember what the directions 
were without being prompted. There is annexed hereto 
a chart comparing the pertinent parts of the testimony of 
these witnesses with respect to the time after the use when 
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Other Length of 
Witness 
Size of Number diseases Symptoms time used of time coops of in flocks before REMARKS 
used or pens Birds during complained of symptoms 
period appeared 
These hens got up to 63Yz% 
picking 
production (R 147). There was 
LaVar 2 months 
pox picking in his flocks before he 
& 10 days tracheitis 
loss of weight about 30 used mintrate (R 179, 180). 
Park various 2850 Pullorum loss of pro~ days (R 148) big liver duction (R 148) 
Park says the chickens of his 
that starved to death from eat~ 
Newcastle (R 148) ing too much oats had more 
flesh on them than the ones that 
died from big liver ( R 187). 
Newcastle No evidence as to number of 
Dan (R 476) 
Dam jan~ 2Yz months 20 X 32 250 hit birds 5 days 
birds died from Newcastle and 
(R 468) (R 462) (R 464) 24 days after picking to 1 week number from picking. ovich started (R 469, 483) (R 469) No evidence as to whether 
feeding stopped dying after stopped 
(R 485) feeding mintrate. 
H. Gail 6 weeks 32 X 20 250 Newcastle pickouts No evidence as to number of 
Smith (R 559) (R 553) (R 555) (R 560) (R 560) no evidence birds that died from Newcastle birds just died or number from picking. 
None .. 
a lot of them Testified on cross examination 
"at that 
time were pick~outs, that chickens starved to death 
Earl 2 months No 650 (R 598), and a lot of 2 months although they were fed scratch 
Sorensen (R 590) evidence (R 588) but had no them simply (R 590) and oats every day and they 
veterinarian starved to cleaned it up. (R 596~8). No 
examine death" evidence on number that alleg~ (R 599) (R 592) edly died. 
4 
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a particular result occurred, what the complaint was in 
each case, the size of the coops, the length of time that 
they used the feed and what damages, if any, were com-
plained of. It is observed that the symptoms of the 
chickens involved were not sufficiently parallel to render 
the evidence produced on this subject competent in the 
Park case. The complaints are not uniform. The symp-
toms of Park's chickens were different from those of some 
of the other users. 
Is it fair to permit recovery based on no more trust-
worthy evidence than this? It may be that if Park came 
into court with a hundred witnesses in this area who had 
used the feed and method, some importance might be 
attached to a uniform result in all of the ·Cases. Certainly 
four users of the feed having different but unsatisfactory 
results does not justify the inference that the feed or the 
method is the proximate cause of the unfortunate situation 
complained of. Defendant produced two witnesses who 
testified that their results were entirely satisfactory. One 
of these, Mr. Alvin Barker, is an eminently successful 
poultryman in Salt Lake County. The testimony of these 
witnesses was absolutely unimpeached. It is to be noted 
that no one besides Park claimed that his chickens lost 
weight. Two of the witnesses said there was no more 
picking than usual in the mintrate and self-feed pens. 
There is no uniformity as to the time between the 
beginning of the feeding and the alleged result. In fact, 
Park used the feed successfully for three or four weeks and 
had his chickens up to nearly 65% production before 
picking started. Denton Black used the feed only twenty 
or twenty-one days altogether. The dearth of evidence 
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as to salient matters is particularly apparent. The record 
is convincing that the conclusions of each of the witnesses 
as to his own results is unsatisfactory. Not one witness 
could say how many birds died over what period of time, or 
exactly what his loss of production was per bird. Plaintiff 
consulted counsel within a month after he was told by the 
company that defendant would not be responsible for his 
loss; yet, despite the fact that the lawsuit was tried some 
fourteen or fifteen months later, plaintiff never consulted 
a veterinarian during the entire period of time. Plaintiff 
produced no evidence that there was any deleterious sub-
stance in Mintrate 40, or that there was anything in de-
fendant's feed other than the contents and the proportions 
appearing on every carton. Plaintiff had the feed tested 
by the Utah State Chemist, but the result of the test must 
not have helped plaintiff, because they were never given to 
the jury. 
Is proof of this nature sufficient to justify the in-
ference that the proximate cause of plaintiff's damage, if 
he had any, was defendant's feed? The burden is upon 
plaintiff to establish proximate causation by competent 
evidence. It is submitted that the jury should not be 
permitted to speculate. The test is if plaintiff's evidence 
is believed, is it sufficient to establish the fact in dispute? 
It is pointed out that this is not the ordinary case of 
claimed negligence in the manufacture or sale of a particu-
lar sack or can or other container of feed, or drink, or 
some other commodity. Plaintiff's daim here is not that 
he got a bad sack of mintrate, or a bad truckload of min-
trate. Plaintiff claims that'there is something wrong with 
the mintrate feed, or, in the alternative, that there is 
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something wrong with the self-feed method of feeding, 
or there is something wrong with the combination of these 
two. The method and kind of feeding were on trial. 
Of importance is the fact that the defendant feed com-
pany has been in the business for fifty years. It has manu-
factured a concentrate feed since 1934. (R. 620) The 
present product, Mintrate 40, has been manufactured 
and sold as an approved product since January, 1945. 
(R. 620) 
The company sells chicken feed throughout the 
United States and engages in a considerable amount of re-
search in Illinois and conducts field tests all over the 
country. (R. 619-622) The feed fulfills the require-
ments of the National Research Council (R. 621) , and 
the feed was not adopted by the company until it had 
been extensively tested. (R. 619-620) In fact, extensive 
tests on the self-feed method have been made by defendant 
company and by a number of universities, and the method 
is recommended by a number of state universities, including 
the University of Ohio. Dr. C. I. Draper of the Depart-
ment of Poultry, Utah State Agricultural College, testi-
fied in detail of his experiments concerning the self-feed 
or cafeteria style of feeding, and his opinion is that it 
can be successfully carried out and that eggs can be suc-
cessfully produced. (R. 741-756) 
After the complaints made by plaintiff and his wit-
nesses to defendant company, the company contacted Mr. 
Alvin Barker of Taylorsville, Utah, and at its request he 
placed some of his chickens on the defendant's feed and 
method to see whether there was anything about the at-
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mospheric or weather conditions in this area which pre-
vented the successful use of the combination. Mr. Barker's 
testimony at the trial appears at Pages 830-848 of the re-
cord. His experiment was carefully conducted, and the 
testimony and records amply demonstrate that the use of 
the feed and method was successful. He got good pro-
duction; the weight of his birds was good, and the mortal-
ity was higher in the mash pens than in the Moorman pens. 
(See R. 8 3 6-8 3 8) In view of these successful uses and the 
unimpeached substantial testimony that the feed was suc-
cessful, and in view of the fact that plaintiff did not pro-
duce any expert testimony as to any deficiency in the food 
or method, it certainly seems clear that there is no sub-
stantial proof that the feed or method or both was the 
cause of plaintiff's difficulties. 
While no case can be found on all fours with the case 
at bar as to the question of proximate cause, it is worth-
while to examine samples of some analogous decisions. 
The general principle of the nature and quality of the 
proof required in instances of this kind is discussed in 2 
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 448 et seq., P. 439 seq. Wig-
more makes clear the proposition that where the proponent 
of proof is attempting to show something stronger than a 
mere capacity, that is, rra general or usual tendency, and 
has evidenced this by a few instances; here, obviously, an 
equal or greater or less number of negative instances, or 
perhaps even a single instance, would help to show that no 
usual or general tendency could be predicted, and thus 
would be practically available to answer the showing made 
by the proponent." 
Wigmore continues: 
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uBut suppose, finally, that the proponent is in-
terested in showing a fair certainty or inevitableness 
of effect; here even a single negative instance would 
suffice to dispose of his contention. The proponent 
cannot claim that an effect is invariably found, 
if an instance is shown in which the effect is not 
found; for example, where it is claimed that a near 
gunshot wound always leaves powde~r-stains, a 
single instance will overturn this claim.'' 
The problem obviously is one of logic. If the major 
premise is all apples are red, the proving of one non-red 
apple is sufficient to avoid the proposed conclusion. 
In Lamb v. Boyles, (1926) 192 N.C. 542, 135 N. E. 
464, the plaintiff drank a bottle of beverage described in 
the decision as strawberry ale, which was manufactured 
by the defendant. Plaintiff was taken ill while drinking 
the ale and was confined to bed and suffered some im-
pairment of vision. Defendant's motion for a non-suit 
at the end of plaintiff's case was denied, and this ruling was 
his chief specification of error on appeal. The Court re-
versed the trial judge, pointing out that there was no 
chemical analysis of the ale and no specific indication of 
poisoning. The Court rejected the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine. 
uin the case at bar there is no evidence that any 
foreign substance was dis.covered in the ale or in 
the bottle. It is too plain for argument that more 
than one inference may be drawn from the evi-
dences as to the cause of plaintiff's sickness and 
under the circumstances disclosed ~4 ~:- ~4 it would 
be unsafe to permit the plaintiff to avail himself 
of the doctrine that the (thing itself speaks'. The 
defendant's motion should have been allowed." 
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In Sheffer v. Willoughby (1896), 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. 
E. 253, the plaintiff ate some oyster stew at defendant's 
restaurant and he became sick while he was eating. The 
court held this was insufficient proof to make a prima 
facie case. 
In Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy Lunch Co., 21 S Mass. 
177, 100 N. E. 1078, plaintiff complained of ptomaine 
poisoning allegedly .caused by eating food at defendant's 
restaurant. The plaintiff introduced no proof other than 
that he became ill after eating, and the Court held that 
this was insufficient to go to the jury. 
lnReesev.Smith, (1937) 9Cal. (2d) 324,70P. (2d) 
9 3 3, the plaintiff became ill while eating sausage. A physi-
cian diagnosed the illness as botulism. The evidence 
tended to show that there were maggots in the uncooked 
portion of the sausage and that poisoning does not occur 
such a short time after eating. Held that the proof failed 
to show that the illness was due to unwholesomeness of the 
sausage. 
, 
In Palmer v. Rosedale Catering Co., ( 1940) La. App. 
195 So. 859, the plaintiff did not feel just right a few hours 
after eating crab meat. The sea food ((didn't taste just 
right" to her. She suffered some intestinal disturbances 
and the attending physician found it necessary to remove 
her appendix. The physician testified that while the crab ~~ 
meat was more likely to cause the disturbance than any-
thing else she had eaten, he would not definitely say it was 
the cause of the trouble. The Court held that she failed 
to establish ( 1) the unwholesomeness of the food, and ( 2) 
the proximate cause. (See 130 A.L.R., Pages 625-626) 
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It is, of course, clear that mere possibilities leave the 
solution of an issue of fact in the field of conjecture. The 
following Utah cases stand for the proposition that a jury's 
verdict may not be based on testimony showing only possi-
bility, nor on speculation, conjecture or suspicion: 
Edwards v. Clark, 83 P. (2d) 1021 
Spackman v. Benefit Assoc. of Ry Employees (1939) 
97 Utah 91, 89 P. (2d) 490 
In the case of Crouch v. National Livestock Remedy 
Co. et al. (1928) 205 Iowa 51,217 N. W. 557, the defend-
ant was a seller of hog remedy. The plaintiff buyer sued 
the defendant upon the theories of implied and express 
warranty and negligence. He introduced evidence over 
objection that other farmers and hog raisers used defend-
ant's hog powder. One witness said he used it on 160 
hogs and 107 of them died within a period of six months, 
and some died as long as six or seven months later. Another 
witness said that he fed it to 150 hogs and that some 60 
to 8 0 died from six to eight weeks after the feeding. 
The Iowa Supreme Court held this testimony to be inad-
missible. The Court said that there was not sufficient 
showing of identical conditions, even though all of the 
witnesses testified that the directions were followed in 
feeding the powder. 
ult is also apparent that the evidence as to the 
death of the hogs is remote from the claimed cause. 
To say that hogs fed at a certain time died csix or 
seven months' after the feeding, or cfrom six weeks 
to three months' thereafter is to open a door for 
speculation and conjecture as to whether there is 
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any causal connection between the feeding and the 
subsequent death at such a remote period." 
Evidence must do more than merely raise a conjecture 
or show a possibility. Sumsion v. Streator Smith, Inc. 
(1943), 103 Utah 44, 132 P. (2d) 680; Anderson v. 
Nixon, 139 P. (2d) 216,104 Utah, 262; Smithv. Industrial 
Cmn. (1943) 104 Utah 318, 140 P. (2d) 314. 
Where plaintiff's undisputed evidence from which 
essential fact is sought to be inferred points with equal 
force to two things, only one of which points to defend-
ant's liability, plaintiff must fail. Reid v. San Pedro, L. A. 
& S. L. R. R., 39 Utah 617, 118 Pac. 1009; Tremelling v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80; Peterson 
v. Richards, 73 Utah 69, 272 P. 229. 
The attention of the Court is again invited to the 
facts testified to by the various users of Mintrate 40 on 
the self-feed method of production. With reference to 
the different symptoms shown by the chickens in each 
case, and the length of time following the use of the feed 
and the method, the Court's attention is invited again 
to the unimpeached testimony of Mr. Barker as to his 
eminently successful use of the feed. Certainly it must 
be concluded in the action as a matter of law that in view 
of the dissimilarity of the results of the witnesses of the 
plaintiff, and all of the other factors involved, there was 
insufficient proof as a matter of law from which the jury 
could infer that any difficulty experienced by the plaintiff 
was the proximate result of defendant's feed and/or the 
self-feed method. 
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POINT NO. V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT C. 
Exhibit C is the writing which was made by Barron, 
in which Barron purports to make certain guarantees con-
cerning the results to be obtained from the use of Mintrate 
40 and the self-feed method of feeding it. At the time it 
was offered it was admitted ((not to bind the company on 
the question of the guaranty," but on the theory that uit 
has some value in showing whether or not the oral con-
versations took place.'' The court stated that it was of the 
opinion that it could not bind the company, and the evi-
dence admitted at that time. Defendant made his objec-
tion clear that it was not admissible for that purpose, and 
that there was no agency or authority for Barron to make 
the representations that appear in the writing under any 
theory of the case. (R. 139-140) The court admitted the 
exhibit and instructed the jury that it was to be considered 
only in connection with the oral representations and not 
for any other purpose. (Ibid) This exhibit was thereupon 
read to the jury. (R. 141) It was before the jury at all 
times after ~his incident, and was taken to the jury room 
for consideration. In the court's instructions it is specifi-
cally pointed out that there could be no recovery under the 
provisions of the writing itself. Nevertheless, the exhibit 
was before the jury at all times, and was frequently men-
tioned during the course of the trial. 
It is submitted that prejudicial error was committed 
in permitting the jury to consider this exhibit. 
The law concerning the lack of authority of Barron in 
making and executing the exhibit has been fully discussed 
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under Point II of this brief. The court itself specifically 
points out in the instruction that the plaintiff could not 
recover under the written instrument. The writing there-
fore was before the jury at all times, even though under 
the trial court's own theory there was absolutely no reason 
for the jury to consider it. 
Error was committed in its being received in evidence. 
The written instrument does not tend in any way or degree 
to corroborate the evidence concerning the alleged oral 
representations of Barron. The only material statement 
of fact concerned the 65% :figure, and nothing in the 
writing itself is even remotely connected with this alleged 
representation. The contents of the writing do not tend 
to corroborate the evidence concerning the oral represen-
tations. Even if they did, at no time during the trial 
was any authority proved for the execution of the exhibit. 
As to Moorman Manufacturing Company, it was and is 
immaterial. 
The written ((guaranty," although not spelling out any 
liability against the defendant, was certainly influential 
in plaintiff's recovery. It tended to emphasize the idea 
that the defendant was liable one way or another. It em-
phasized the feeling which permeated the trial that the 
judge thought plaintiff should recover on some theory. 
It was highly prejudicial and certainly tended to influence 
the reaction and decision of the jury. 
POINT NO. VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS THEORY OF DAMAGES. 
A. The Court erred in permitting recovery based upon 
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the loss of chickens and, in addition, the loss of profits from 
the dead chickens. 
In his complaint plaintiff attempted to recover for loss 
of profits based on calculated egg loss from the time when 
he started feeding mintrate until the time of the trial some 
sixteen months later. The trial court held in substance 
that he could recover to and including December 9, 1948, 
as far as his egg loss was concerned, and to December 4, 
1948, as to his bird loss. Not only were plaintiff's damages 
after that time speculative under the theories of the trial 
court, but a reasonable and prudent poultryman would 
have replaced the chickens by that time and thereby min-
imized his loss. 
A basic error in the Court's theory on damages was 
that recovery was permitted for the value of dead birds 
and culls, and the jury was permitted to find, in addition, 
that the plaintiff would have received a certain number 
of eggs from the dead chickens and that he would have 
made a profit on these eggs. Attention is particularly 
directed to the third paragraph of Instruction No. 18, 
where the Court says: 
ccln determining the amount of damage, you are 
instructed that plaintiff is entitled to the value of 
the eggs, less the cost of producing the same, that 
the dead hens and culls would have laid from the 
time of the damage to each hen until plaintiff could 
replace it, acting with the speed and diligence of an 
ordinary prudent poultryman." 
Attention is invited to the whole of Instructions Nos. 
17 and 18. 
The law is well settled that damages cannot be re-
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covered for the value of animals and also for loss of profits 
which the dead animals would have made. The market 
value of an animal takes into consideration the potential 
profit to be made by the animal for its owner. If beef 
is selling for 25c a pound, the value of a one-year-old 
steer, weighing a certain number of pounds, can be defini-
tely computed. It certainly would be unrealistic to permit 
the owner of the animal to recover its value and as well to 
receive an amount as profits that might have been made 
had the animal lived to be two years old. 
In the case of S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker (1934) 
27 P. (2d) 678, 42 Ariz. 503, a colony of bees was de-
stroyed by poison. The owner was permitted to re-
cover the market value of the bees at the time and place 
of the loss, plus reasonable expense incurred in his effort 
to mitigate the loss, but no recovery was permitted based 
on the theory of loss of increase. The decision was re-
versed by the Arizona Supreme Court on the grounds that 
double recovery was contrary to law, and in addition, 
highly speculative on the facts. The Court said: 
uin addition to the above items of damage, 
plaintiff claimed damages by reason of the loss of 
increase, fixed at 250 hives. This claim, it seems to 
us, is entirely too speculative and uncertain. While 
the bee is industrious, dependable and intelligent, 
it is short-lived; sixty to ninety days is his allotted 
time. The span from October 11th to spring, when 
the bee swarms, is greater than the life of the bee. 
What colony or how many would have doubled 
and swarmed in the following spring is too much of 
a guess to be the basis of a claim for damages." 
In Miller v. Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co., 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
65 
293 N. W. 4, 228 Iowa 693, an action was brought by an 
owner of sheep on an alleged express warranty against the 
seller of certain stock powder. The Court said at P. 11, 
Northwest Reporter: 
uPart 2 of the Instruction allowed damages 
based on ascertainable future profits on the dead 
animals in addition to their value at the time of the 
deaths allowed by part 1. This was erroneous. The 
measure of damages for the wrongful destruction 
of an animal is its value, less salvage, if any. 3 C.J.S., 
Animals, Section 234; 17 C. J., Damages. Section 
185." 
The Court says that the measure of damages is the 
same as in tort: 
((Presumably payment to the injured party of 
the value of the animal before death would make 
him whole. He would not be entitled to future 
profits in addition to present value." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The lower court was reversed for failure to instruct 
properly as to measure of damages. The editors of Corpus 
Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum concur in expressing the 
idea that the recovery value of a dead animal is the market 
value plus any salvage. It is stated that where the recovery 
is for loss of profits from an injured animal, the damage 
shall in no case exceed the animal's value. 3 C. J. S., 
Animals, Sec. 234, P. 1345 et seq.; 17 C. J., Damages, Sec. 
185, P. 879. 
In the case of Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Gelvin, 
238 Fed. 14, 151 C. C. A. 90, L. R. A. 1917C, 983, the 
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plaintiff's cattle were injured through alleged negligence 
of the defendant railroad. The Court held that the mea-
sure of damages was the difference between the value of 
the cattle before and after the alleged injury. The second 
headnote from the decision in this case is as follows: 
((Sparks escaping from defendant's locomotive 
ignited brush and weeds on its right of way, which 
fire was communicated to plaintiff's pasture and 
meadow land, where it destroyed about 150 acres 
of grass and frightened defendant's 391 head of 
high-grade fat cattle, which he was feeding for the 
market. The cattle stampeded by reason of the 
smoke and roar of the fire, and one of them was 
killed, and all received bruises, becoming over-
heated. Thereafter the teeth of the cattle became 
sore from eating short grass and weeds raised on the 
burnt land, and they would not eat. There was 
evidence that, by reason of the soreness of their 
teeth and their fright, the cattle did not put on 
weight at the customary rate, and that when they 
were marketed in Chicago, a city in another state, 
they were not heavy enough to bring the top price; 
heavy cattle being in demand. Held, that as the 
measure of damages for injuries from the fire was 
the difference in the value of the cattle immediately 
before and after the fire at the place of injury, 
evidence that the cattle did not put on weight as 
fast as was customary for cattle being so fed, and 
that they did not bring the top price because they 
were not heavy, was inadmissible, as relating to 
speculative matters." 
The Court said: 
((We think the inquiry as to the probable gain 
of these cattle in the event there had been no fire, 
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and therefore the probable weight at the time of 
their sale in Chicago, in the fall succeeding the fire, 
the classification of the cattle as to weight, placing 
them in the lighter class, the fact that heavy cattle, 
in the fall, at the time of marketing the cattle, were 
in better demand, and therefore brought a higher 
price at that time and place, without even a sugges-
tion that the heavier cattle were in better demand 
than lighter cattle, at the time of the fire, or that 
heavier cattle had a greater value, at Maitland, 
either before or after the fire, are not proper ele-
ments to be considered by the jury in determining 
the value of the cattle just prior to the alleged in-
jury and the value just subsequent thereto; the dam-
age being the difference, if any." 
These cases are precisely in point with the case at bar. 
There is no reason why plaintiff could not have replaced 
the dead birds and culls. His only loss then would have 
been the value of the birds replaced. The court erred in 
permitting the double recovery here allowed, and returned 
by the jury, under Instruction Number 18. 
B. The evidence with reference to loss of profit was 
remote and conjectural. It lacks the definiteness and com-
pleteness required by law for proof of this nature of da·m-
ages. The Court, therefore erred in permitting the case 
to go to the jury upon the theory of loss of profits. 
Throughout the trial there was difficulty experienced 
by the plaintiff in proving damage of any kind, and 
particularly loss of profits. Evidence of the theory 
first submitted by the plaintiff was placed before the 
jury during the early part of the trial and requires ap-
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proximately eleven pages of the transcript. (R. pp. 158-168 
inclusive) The Court took the motions to strike this evi-
dence and the objections to it under advisement and later 
refused to permit the jury to consider the damages sub-
mitted at this time because the nature of the proof was 
not such that it ,could be understood, and, too, because 
the kind of figures and evidence presented was wholly 
speculative and conjectural. Various kinds of evidence 
concerning damage through loss of profits were presented 
upon several other occasions before plaintiff. rested. 
The final results of plaintiff's effort to prove damage 
for loss of profits were embodied in Exhibit R, which pur-
ports to be a summarization of the testimony of John R. 
Miller, beginning at Page 528 of the record. The testimony 
of Mr. Miller, and also of other witnesses called by the 
plaintiff, was that on July 3, 1948, there were three I 
thousand four hundred ninety -one chickens on the west j1 
side of the road in the coops referred to herein for con-
venience as non-mintrate ,coops. There were twenty-
eight hundred fifty birds using mintrate under the self- 1 1 
feed program on the east side of the road. (R. 529) · 1 
According to the egg charts of the plaintiff, between the 
3rd day of July and the 9th day of December, 1948, 
250,156 eggs were laid by the non-mintrate chickens. The 
witness computed that 2,850 is 81.6 per cent of 3,491, so 
that under plaintiff's theory of the case the mintrate 
chickens should have laid 81.6 per cent as many eggs as the 
250,156 eggs laid by the chickens west of Redwood Road. 
The Court should keep in mind that the defendant 
does not admit by adopting these figures of the plaintiff's 
that they are by any means correct or accurate, or that 
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they were produced as admissible evidence, or that the 
evidence qualifies under any exception to the hearsay rule. 
The fact is that they are entirely self-serving and hearsay 
as to this defendant. However, the trial court admitted 
them into the evidence and the jury had no other figures 
to consider; so for the purpose of this argument the de-
fendant has no other figures to use. 
The product of 81.6% x 250,156 is 204,135 eggs. 
This represents, according to plaintiff's theory, the num-
ber of eggs that should have been produced by the mintrate 
birds had they laid the same number as were produced 
by the non-mintrate chickens. (R. 530, 531) Mr. Miller 
testified that according to his egg charts the plaintiff 
actually received 156,157 eggs from the mintrate birds 
during the period of time in question. The difference 
between the number of eggs plaintiff says he should have 
received, 204,135, and the number he did receive, 156, 157, 
is 47,370, or, figuring thirty dozen to a .case, a total of 
131.58 cases. (R. 528-533) These figures were duly 
objected to by the defendant; the defendant duly made 
a motion for a nonsuit and asked the court for a directed 
verdict, and also asked the court not to submit the matter 
of loss of profits to the jury based upon the idea that the 
proof of damages on the theory were insufficient, specu-
lative and erroneous. 
Counsel for plaintiff asked Mr. Miller on direct 
examination ( R. 53 2) : 
((Question by Mr. Rich: Do you know how 
much eggs were selling for during the fall of 1948? 
A. I know approximately what they averaged 
during that ti_me. 
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Q. What was the average? 
MR. McKAY: I object to that as improper, not 
showing the market value at any time, no founda-
tion laid for the answer. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. What is the average? 
A. Fifteen dollars per case." 
Based upon this estimate as to the average cost, the 
witness was permitted to testify that the amount of plain-
tiff's damage for loss of profits during the period was 
$2,004.00. He then corrected the figure to be $1,974.00. 
Later the same witness testified to the same theory and, 
correcting his arithmetic in small details, arrived at the 
figure of $1,973.40 as the egg loss. (R. 537) 
It is pointed out specifically that this figure is based 
upon a sale price of eggs at $15.00 per case. It is a well 
known and uncontroverted fact that the price of eggs 
is extremely speculative. Pullet eggs are not nearly as 
valuable as hen eggs, and eggs during the month of Oc-
tober and the latter part of September are much more 
valuable than eggs produced in December and the latter 
part of November. No direct evidence whatsoever was 
offered by the plaintiff as to any specific prices of eggs 
during the entire period from July 3rd to December 9th. · 
No evidence was presented as to the fluctuation in the 
market. The fact that there was such a change in market 
conditions appears affirmatively from plaintiff's own evi-
dence and, in fact, from plaintiff himself. It is submit-
ted, therefore, that the court erroneously permitted the 
, 
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figure of $15.00 per case to be used as an average in com-
puting the value of eggs during this period of time. 
It appears from the document designated ((Judgment 
on Verdict" submitted to the jury, upon which it was to 
return its verdict in the case (R. 100), that it was per-
mitted to find under the heading ttFor Loss of Egg Yield" 
a total of $1973.70 as damage for the plaintiff. One 
striking and important thing about this figure is that it 
fails to take into consideration in any manner or degree the 
cos.t of feeding the chickens involved during this seven 
months period. Recovery is obtained simply for the differ-
ence between the number of eggs produced on the west 
side of the road and the number of eggs produced on the 
east side on a pro rata basis. The essential element in com-
puting loss of profits is to produce evidence, so that the 
jury may arrive at a :figure that presents the difference. be-
tween the cost of production and the gross sales. 
It is not sufficient in this case for the plaintiff to 
prove that he should have received 47,3 70 more eggs than 
he did receive. For all that appears it may have cost him 
two thousand dollars or :five thousand dollars, or more per-
haps, to feed the chickens and properly care for them, and 
in otherwise managing his flock, to produce the eggs which 
give him the sales price, according to his :figures, of 
$1973.70. It appears from his testimony and from the 
fact that he claims damage for loss of chickens that he 
was not feeding as many chickens proportionately on 
the east side as he was on the west. How many less were 
being fed during that period of time does not appear from 
the evidence, but plaintiff's testimony is that at the time 
of his count on December 9th or 13th, 1948, he had 
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1,318 birds on the Mintrate side out of the original 2850. 
This means that during the period of time in which he 
claims loss of profit, plaintiff lost in the mintrate pens 1532 
birds. We do not know and the plaintiff does not know, 
nor did any of the witnesses know, whether these birds 
died or were culled during the first week after July 3rd, 
or during the first week before December 9th. The point 
is that if there had been birds living that would have pro-
duced the 47,378 eggs, which he complains were lost, he 
would have had to feed more chickens, and he would have 
been required to furnish them straw and to have the eggs 
cleaned and crated and the birds cared for by a hired man. 
None of these costs were taken into consideration in any 
manner whatsoever in arriving at a figure for loss of 
profits. 
It is interesting to see how essential this information 
is before it is possible to arrive at a reasonably sound figure. 
Plaintiff testified that it cost eight and one-third cents per 
week per chicken for feed. (R. 579, 580, 581) It is to 
be noted in this connection that Mr. Park does not furn-
ish any details as to what this eight and one-third cents per 
week included. It is not clear whether it includes alfalfa, 
concentrates or mash and oats, and wheat and scratch, or 
whether it includes all feeds of all kinds. Defendant 
objected at the time that the figure was used, and still 
contends that such an estimate without proof of the de-
tails of feed cost is unwarranted as a basis for proof of 
damage in a case of this kind. However, using plaintiff's 
own estimates, the feed cost for the dead chickens, the 
profit from whose production plaintiff is attempting to 
recover, would reach an astonishing figure. 
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Plaintiff claims that he lost 15 3 2 chickens. If the 
figure is divided in half, so that a rough average is obtained 
as to the number of chickens he had during the entire per-
iod, the figure of 756 is the result. Defendant would like to 
have a more exact figure, but despite thorough cross-
examination, it is not to be had. Park simply did not 
know. There are twenty-three weeks from July 3rd to 
December 9th, and, based on a figure of eight and one-
third cents per week per chicken, plaintiff's feed bill 
would have been $1462.29 during this period. (Of course, 
it may be argued that there were losses of chickens in the 
non-mintrate pens and that this basis for computing is not 
fair, since it does fail to take into consideration the cost 
of production of the non-mintrate birds.) The point, 
however, is that there is simply no evidence one way or 
another which furnishes any reliable guide to the jury 
or to the court in fixing the cost of production for these 
birds and the 47,378 eggs which they purportedly would 
produce. Moreover, the eight and one-third cents figure 
includes only the feed. How much did the plaintiff pay 
for his hired help to take care of the chickens and gather 
the eggs? How much did he pay for straw? What were 
his overhead costs, including gasoline, car upkeep, lights~ 
water, building repair, rent, depreciation and maintenance? 
There is not one iota of evidence in the record as to any of 
these items. Certainly, it cost plaintiff something to be in 
the chicken business as a matter of overhead and operating 
expense. If the plaintiff could have been fortunate enough 
to raise a flock of chickens without any deaths or culls, he 
would have had some expenses in producing the number 
of eggs claimed. What were those expenses? 
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Defendant submits that gross error was committed 
by the court in permitting the jury to return a verdict 
awarding damages to plaintiff in the amount of $1973.70, 
or any other amount, in the absence of proof of these items. 
The law is clear that in situations where damages 
for loss of profits is recoverable, proof of such damage 
must be made clear and convincing and must transcend 
the realm of conjecture and speculation. The very term 
uprofits" suggests something more than gross sales. It is 
for this reason that the law does not permit damage of this 
kind for a new business or enterprise. 
This defendant does not contend that loss of profits 
is not in a proper case and with proper proof a correct 
theory of damages. The more recent cases support the 
proposition that loss of profits may in certain situations 
be recoverable. What is contended is that the proof in the 
case at bar lacks such definiteness and certainty as is re-
quired in proof of such damages. While no citation of 
authority is required, perhaps, for the notion that profits 
is a different thing as a matter of law from gross sales, the 
court's attention is invited to the line of cases holding 
uthat prospective profits of a new non-industrial business, 
or one merely in contemplation, are too uncertain and 
speculative to form a basis for recovery, for the reason that 
there are no facts extant (provable data of past business), 
as in the ,case of an existing or established business, from 
which the amount of such profits may be established with 
reasonable certainty." 99 A.L.R. 938. 
The editor of this A.L.R. Annotation points out 
that the line is drawn between cases where past experience 
provided proof with reference to costs and gross sales, 
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whereas, new businesses are unable to produce such proof, 
and, therefore, prospective profits from new enterprises 
were not considered sufficiently certain and definite to 
justify recovery. The cases along this line follow the 
reasoning of such decisions as Eller son v. Grove ( 19 3 0) 
C.C.A. 4th, 44 Fed. (2d) 493, where the court said: 
nHe who is prevented from embarking in a 
new business can recover no profits because there 
are no provable data of past business on which the 
fact of anticipated profits would have been real-
ized can be legally deduced." 
This principle and the cases which follow it are dis-
tinguished from such cases as National Soda Products Co. 
v. City of Los Angeles, et al., Supreme Court of California 
(1943), 143 P. (2d) 12, 23 Cal. (2d) 193. 
These cases are only intended as illustrations of the 
somewhat obvious principle that cost must certainly be 
proved with reasonable certainty based on past experience 
if loss of profits is to be computed as a measure of damages. 
The cases appearing in the annotation at 99 A.L.R. 938 are 
all to this effect. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff was admittedly an ex-
perienced chicken raiser in the sense that he had or should 
have had in his possession records of costs of operation, 
including feeding costs, labor expenses, depreciation, rent, 
cost of light and car expense, and matters of that kind. 
He put into evidence none of these records, and he testi-
fied as to none of them himself. The only evidence which 
he presented, and which was received by the court, was 
as heretofore pointed out-his estimate based upon these 
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records that the cost of feed was eight and one-third cents 
per chicken per week. Plaintiff was not qualified as a book-
keeper or accountant, and the introduction of this estimate 
by him, based upon records which were not in evidence, 
was manifestly and clearly error. It is impossible to de-
termine what kind of feeds were included and, of course, 
it is therefore impossible to determine what weight, if any, 
should be given to the testimony. 
Moreover, the period of time used in making the 
estimate is not shown. It is impossible to tell from the 
estimate itself whether an entire year is figured, including 
the time during which a chicken admittedly does not pro-
duce any eggs, or whether the period of time is based upon 
the lifetime of a chicken, or whether it is based upon the 
laying period, or whether the figure represents the amount 
that is to be fed to white leghorn chi.ckens, or some other 
kind. Moreover, as heretofore pointed out, there is no 
proof of any other overhead. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that eggs must 
be gathered and cleaned before they are ready for sale; 
that chickens must be fed and watered; that coops must be 
cleaned and kept in repair. Ordinary business experience 
is sufficient for the assertion that there are overhead and 
management costs that must be taken into consideration. 
None of these figures were put into evidence in any manner 
whatsoever, and even the evidence as to the feed costs, 
which was improperly in evidence, was used to compute 
the loss of profits. The conclusion from the jury's verdict 
is inescapable that the jury did not .consider any of these 
matters in arriving at its verdict. 
It is submitted that under the facts of this case and 
i (, 
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the applicable legal principles, the court should have held 
as a matter of law that evidence of loss of profits was in-
sufficient to go to the jury, and that the instructions per-
mitting recovery based upon this theory were clearly 
erroneous. 
C. The procedure in the trial with respect to proof 
was prejudicial to defendant's cause. 
Plaintiff had great difficulty in proving damages in 
this case. The first effort consumes approximately eleven 
pages in the record. (R. 159-168), and the facts and 
figures are so unintelligible, vague and uncertain that all 
of defendant's objections to the evidence were taken under 
advisement. (R. 167) The court decided that such evi-
dence was insufficient and required further proof. How-
ever, all of plaintiff's figures were left on the blackboard 
and remained there for a period of approximately one week 
during the course of the trial. (See R. 8 57) . The photo-
graph of the figures appears in the :files; Exhibit 42 and 
43). 
The second effort to prove damages was made by hav-
ing defendant's hired man, John A. Miller, testify. Mr. 
Miller made further speculations and estimates without 
being requested to produce the source of his costs and esti-
mates, all of which testimony was over the objection of the 
defendant. (SeeR. 527, 535, 536, 552) 
When plaintiff presented his case the first time the 
Court recognized that there was no adequate evidence 
concerning damages, and he thereupon permitted the plain-
tiff to reopen and introduce further evidence. At one 
time during the testimony of Miller the Court mentioned 
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to counsel for plaintiff that he had given counsel a certain 
figure, and .counsel for plaintiff in the presence of the 
jury commented upon having received figures on the 
amount of damages from the Court. (R. 529, 530) This 
conduct was highly prejudicial and gave the jury the im-
pression that the Court was working with plaintiff in 
computing and assessing damages against the defendant. 
The day after this occurrence in court, the trial judge 
commented to the jury upon the statements made the day 
before, and explained that plaintiff had a right to have 
his theory of damages presented to the jury. (SeeR. 538-
541) This comment had the further effect of emphasizing 
to the jury that plaintiff was entitled to damages, rather 
than helping the situation. Under the circumstances here 
the Court's comments only emphasized and reiterated its 
conduct of the day before. 
After all of the trial, and even after counsel for both 
sides had argued their cases to the jury, the Court, before 
dismissing it for deliberation, invited the jury's attention 
to the exhibit of plaintiff, which computed damages and 
gave further instructions on the question of damages. 
(R. 859, 860) Coming at this time, and in view of the 
previous occurrences and actions of counsel and the Court 
with reference to damages, this was an extremely unfair 
and prejudicial kind of procedure. 
It is recognized that the conduct of the trial in general 
is in the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be that 
the Court did not intend to over-emphasize damages by its 
repeated and consistent help to plaintiff's counsel in and 
out of the presence of the jury. The fact is that the matter 
was handled in such a manner and at such times that it 
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could not help but be prejudicial. In so conducting itself, 
the Court abused its discretion. 
D. In instructing upon damages, the Court failed to 
take into consideration the intervening causes which the 
evidence of the plaintiff shows to have proximately caused 
or approximately contributed to the deaths and/or loss of 
production, if any, in plaintiff's chickens, and the Court 
failed to instruct the jury properly upon the duty of the 
plaintiff to minimize his loss. 
The subject of proximate cause as it relates to the facts 
in the present case is argued in some detail elsewhere in 
this brief. We point out at this time only that the subject 
is important and has far-reaching consequences insofar 
as the measure of damages is concerned. The plaintiff 
used Mintrate 40 and the self-feed method of feeding 
chickens for a period of approximately six weeks. As 
stated elsewhere in this brief, there is probably no proof 
of any kind that either the food or the method impairs 
the health or laying ability of white leghorn hens, or of 
any other chicken. Even if we should assume, however, 
that the health or laying ability was impaired in some de-
gree by the use of the feed or the method, the evidence 
discloses that many other factors contributed to any loss 
which plaintiff had during the time from the middle of 
June until the middle of December, during which period 
the plaintiff was permitted to recover damages, both for 
death losses and production loss. 
It is admitted both by the plaintiff himself and by all 
of the witnesses who purported to know anything whatso-
ever about the chicken business, that the business is highly 
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precarious and that chickens die at a rapid rate or go off 
production for causes which are unknown to the poultry 
man. Mr. Conta, for example, testified that in his twenty 
or thirty years in the chicken business, chickens in one 
coop on the same poultry farm as another coop would die 
or go off in production when no other coop was affected, 
the feed being the same and the chickens having precisely 
the same care and raised under the same conditions. That 
being so, it is particularly important to consider the ques-
tions of intervening causes,-particularly diseases that got 
into the plaintiff's chickens during the period of time in 
question. 
Plaintiff and Mr. John Miller, the hired man of the 
plaintiff, testified that during the last part of September 
and the fore part of October, 1948, Newcastle disease 
became prevalent in plaintiff's chickens on both sides of 
the road. Both of these witnesses testified that their obser-
vation was that the disease hit somewhat more heavily 
on the mintrate side than on the non-mintrate birds, but 
neither had kept any record as to deaths or culls, and nei-
ther could testify as to what extent the disease was more 
prevalent in the mintrate coops. The fact that this disease 
hit the flocks is the important consideration. Heavy loss 
resulted and the chickens went into a moult. It is elemen-
tary that a person liable either in contract or tort is not 
liable for damage which results from an intervening cause. 
Certainly a disease of this kind is not foreseeable in a legal 
sense, and this disease in September must be considered as 
an intervening cause as a matter of law. Instead of so in-
structing the jury, the court permitted recovery based 
upon both death and loss of production and culls until the 
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middle of December. It is submitted that on the basis of 
the evidence and the record, no jury could be expected to 
determine fairly and with a reasonable degree of accuracy 
what portion of the loss in the mintrate coops was due to 
Newcastle disease, and what portion, if any, was due to 
dietary deficiency, if any, in these birds, as a result of a 
breach of duty by defendant. 
Another factor that is of importance in considering 
the question of intervening cause is the picking that was 
present as early as the middle of May or the first part of 
June, when Gail Barron first talked with the plaintiff, 
and which continued, according to plaintiff's testimony, 
throughout the summer months, and was particularly 
active in the flocks and apparent around the 24th of July. 
Picking occurs in chicken flocks for various and sometimes 
undetermined reasons. It can hardly be claimed, and was 
not seriously claimed by the plaintiff in this case, that 
picking in his flocks was a proximate result or even con-
tributed to by Mintrate 40 or the self-feed method. Plain-
tiff did not testify and did not produce any evidence of 
any kind with respect to the question of what portion of 
his loss in birds and what portion of the resulting egg loss 
was due to picking. The Court's instructions did not aid 
the jury in any way in making a determination of the 
allocation of this kind of disease or condition. In fact, 
the sum total effect of the court's instructions was to per-
mit the jury to lay all of the loss from whatever source 
to the feed of the defendant. 
It submitted that especially in view of the factors 
which play a part in determining the health and produc-
tive capacity of chickens, the failure of the court to in-
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struct properly and completely on the principles of inter-
vening .cause was prejudicial and gross error. 
One further matter is directed to the attention of the 
court in connection with the instructions on damages. 
Plaintiff fed the Mintrate 40 and used the self-feed method 
of production for approximately six weeks. For the first 
three or four weeks, at least, he was able to find nothing 
wrong with it. In fact, his testimony is that his chickens 
increased in production and the mintrate birds produced 
at a higher rate than did the birds on the west side of 
Redwood Road. (R. 147) 
Sometime between the 24th of July and the 1st of 
August, plaintiff decided that his chickens had been made 
ill by the use either of the method or the particular kind 
of concentrated feed, and he took his chickens off the 
feed. The evidence is that in the latter part of August or 
the first of September, approximately, the plaintiff con-
sulted an attorney. The plaintiff did not at any time from 
the first sickness allegedly noted in his chickens, or the 
first undue amount of picking in July until the time of this 
lawsuit in the latter part of October, 1948, call in a vet-
erinarian to determine what was wrong with his chickens, 
or what could be done to put them back into full produc-
tion or on a healthy basis. From the beginning, it appears 
that plaintiff did everything possible to increase his damage 
and basis for his recovery in planning for this lawsuit, 
rather than to mitigate his loss. Even the written guarantee 
which was introduced into evidence as Exhibit C stated 
that in the event of sickness the plaintiff and a representa-
tive of Moorman Manufacturing Company would call in 
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a disinterested veterinarian to examine the chickens for 
illness and determine its cause. 
In the face of this agreement, and even though plain-
tiff had consulted counsel nearly fifteen months before 
the action was tried, no veterinarian had ever examined 
the chickens. The only thing he did to stop the picking 
was to paint the birds with a salve, while debeaking appears 
to be the only deterrent. (See testimony of Conta, R. 
346) Can plaintiff come into court now and claim that 
he took reasonable steps to lessen his loss when he 
did not as much as call in an expert to determine the 
cause of sickness? Plaintiff did not testify as to one thing 
that he did to prevent his own loss, except that he changed 
back to the feed he had previously used. He did not at any 
time attempt to determine from expert sources what kinds 
of feed, if any, might restore the productive capacity or 
stop picking. 
Moreover, if in July or the first of August, plaintiff 
noted that his birds were ill, as a prudent and reasonable 
poultry raiser, knowing the propensity of chickens for 
easy disturbance in laying and production, and knowing 
the ease with which disease is communicated, would not 
plaintiff, as a reasonable man, replace his flocks with some 
birds that had not been damaged? Of course, it is quite 
possible that all of plaintiff's testimony is impeached by 
this fact, and that he did not notice anything wrong with 
the birds because there was nothing wrong with them, 
and that he simply changed feed and is trying ·to recover 
from the defendant the natural losses from disease during 
these months in his poultry-raising business. But if the 
plaintiff's testimony is believed and he noticed something 
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wrong with them, and he noticed the loss of production, 
could he as a reasonable and prudent man continue to lose 
money on these birds and lay the damage to the feed of 
Moorman Manufacturing Company? Certainly, the court 
should not permit the plaintiff to speculate at the defend-
ant's expense. It is submitted that there was a ready and 
available market for chickens for meat during the months 
of September and October and August, 1947, and that 
the evidence shows that pullets up to five months of age 
were available for purchase. 
The reasonable position is that if plaintiff is entitled 
to recover anything in this action, his damages should be 
the difference between the value of his flock after plain-
tiff stopped using the defendant's feed and the self-feed 
method and the value of other birds that could be pur-
chased to replace plaintiff's birds on the open market. If 
plaintiff lost ten or twenty days' production as a result 
of changing from one flock to another, perhaps this loss 
could be recovered. Of course, it must be proved by 
competent and reasonably certain evidence. 
It is submitted that the theory upon which the ques-
tion of damages was placed before the jury simply per-
mitted the plaintiff to speculate and did not require him 
as a matter of law to mitigate the loss. In this par-
ticular, as well as in those heretofore pointed out, de-
fendant submits that the court committed gross and pre-
judicial and reversible error. 
SUMMARY 
It is submitted that the court erred in each of the parti-
culars set forth in this brief. Based on the proof submitted 
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at the trial, there is no theory in law supported by sub-
stantial evidence upon which plaintiff could recover 
against this defendant. The court should make an order 
setting aside the judgment of the trial court and dismissing 
the complaint with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. McK.A Y 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN 
and RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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